Literature Review: Metacognition in Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder: A Systematic Review; Empirical Paper: Metacognition in Children: How do the Emergent Awareness Abilities of Prediction, Error Detection and Evaluation Change by Age? by Jenkin, R
1 
Running Head: METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
 
 
LITERATURE REIVIEW: Metacognition in Children with Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder: A Systematic Review 
 EMPIRICAL PAPER: Metacognition in Children: How do the 
emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error detection and evaluation 
change by age? 
 
 
Submitted by Rebecca Tegen Jenkin, to the University of Exeter  
as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Clinical Psychology, May 2019 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for 
the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
 
Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 
 
2 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents 2 
List of Tables 6 
List of Figures 7 
LITERATURE REVIEW 8 
Abstract 9 
Introduction 10 
Methods 14 
Search Strategy 14 
Search Terms 15 
Eligibility Criteria 16 
Evaluation Criteria 17 
Results 17 
Critical Summary 26 
Predictive Emergent Awareness 27 
Evaluative Emergent Awareness 29 
Discussion 31 
Clinical Implications 33 
Limitations 34 
Future Research 34 
Conclusion 35 
3 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
References 36 
Appendix A – Quality Assessment Tool for Quantitative Studies 44 
Appendix B - Preparation and Submission Requirements for the Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders 
52 
EMPIRICAL PAPER 54 
Abstract 55 
Introduction 57 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 60 
Method 61 
Participants 61 
Power Analyses 62 
Design 62 
Materials 62 
The Junior Metacognitive Assessment Inventory 62 
The Dual-task Attention to Response Task 63 
Judgment of Confidence Task 65 
Procedure  66 
Proposed Data Analysis Strategy 68 
How do children’s emergent awareness abilities of 
prediction, error detection and evaluation differ between 
younger and older children? 
68 
Is there a relationship between prediction, error detection 
and evaluation? Does this differ between younger and older 
children? 
70 
4 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
How does children’s subjective metacognitive knowledge 
differ in younger and older children? How do children’s 
emergent awareness abilities relate to their subjective 
metacognitive knowledge in these age groups? 
70 
Results 71 
How do children’s emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error 
detection and evaluation differ between younger and older children? 
71 
Error Detection 71 
Prediction 72 
Evaluation 72 
Is there a relationship between prediction, error detection and 
evaluation? Does this differ between younger and older children? 
74 
How does children’s subjective metacognitive knowledge differ in 
younger and older children? How do children’s emergent 
awareness abilities relate to their subjective metacognitive 
knowledge in these age groups? 
77 
Discussion 78 
Clinical Implications 82 
Strengths and Limitations  83 
Future Research 85 
Conclusion 85 
References 87 
Appendix A: The Metacognitive Assessment Inventories (Version A & B) 94 
Appendix B: Judgment of Confidence Task 95 
5 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
Appendix C: Ethics Approval Letter 97 
Appendix D: Information Leaflet for Schools 99 
Appendix E: Headteacher and Teacher Consent Forms 101 
Appendix F: Information Leaflet and Consent Form for Parents/Carers 103 
Appendix G: Child Information Sheet, Consent Form and Debrief Sheet 106 
Appendix H: Missing Data for JOC Questions 109 
Appendix I: Outlier Analysis 110 
Appendix J: Dissemination Statement 111 
Appendix K: Preparation and Submission Requirements for Consciousness 
and Cognition 
112 
 
6 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
List of Tables 
Literature Review 
Table 1. Search Terms used in the Literature Review. 
Table 2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria used for the Literature Review. 
Table 3. Summary of Eligible Studies from the Literature Search Strategy and 
Eligibility Screening. 
Empirical paper 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of the error detection, prediction, and 
evaluation scores by age group. 
Table 2. Correlations among prediction, error detection, evaluation, and 
metacognitive knowledge by age. 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of the subjective metacognitive 
knowledge scores by age group. 
Table A1. The number (N) of missing data points for each of the Judgment Of 
Confidence (JOC) questions.  
Table A2. Correlations among prediction, error detection, evaluation, and 
metacognitive knowledge by age with outliers removed. 
 
7 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
List of Figures 
Literature Review 
Figure 1. Krasny-Pacini et al.’s (2015) model of online/emergent awareness, 
which breaks this down into offline and ‘true’ online awareness.  
Figure 2. Results of the Literature Search Strategy and Eligibility Screening. 
Empirical Study 
Figure 1. Flowchart showing recruitment of participants
8 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
 
 
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY 
DOCTORATE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Metacognition in Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder: A Systematic 
Review 
 
Trainee Name:   Rebecca Tegen Jenkin 
Primary Research Supervisor: Dr Jenny Limond 
Senior Lecturer and Research Director for 
DclinPsy, University of Exeter 
Secondary Research Supervisor: Dr Nick Moberley 
Senior Lecturer, University of Exeter 
 
Target Journal:   Journal of Autism and Developmental  
    Disorders 
 
Word Count:   4624 words (excluding abstract, table of 
contents, list of figures, references, footnotes, 
appendices) 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the Doctorate Degree in 
Clinical Psychology, University of Exeter 
9 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
Abstract 
Objective: Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) may struggle with 
their metacognition due to having poor theory of mind; i.e., their lack of 
awareness of how others are feeling may also mean they lack self-awareness 
of their own cognitive strengths and weaknesses. This systematic review 
collated research that investigated metacognitive skills of emergent awareness 
(specifically prediction, error detection, and evaluation of own performance on a 
task) in children with and without ASD. The review addressed the question: do 
children with ASD have diminished emergent awareness compared to neuro-
typical children? 
Method: Systematic searches were conducted in PsycINFO, Ovid Medline, 
EMBASE, Cochrane library, and Web of Science databases with specific search 
terms. Studies were published before December 2018. A total of 1,247 records 
were identified, which reduced to 620 once duplicates were removed. Screening 
these by title and abstract resulted in 24 full-text articles being assessed for 
eligibility. Fourteen were excluded and so ten articles were included in the 
review.   
Results: No included articles explored the emergent awareness ability of error 
detection in children with ASD. The studies suggested children with ASD did not 
have diminished prediction ability compared to those without ASD, but results 
were more mixed for the emergent awareness skill of evaluation.  
Conclusions: Not all components of emergent awareness appear to be 
diminished in children with ASD compared to typically developing children. 
Further research is required to address limitations of the lack of valid and 
reliable measures and experimenter blinding. 
Keywords: autistic spectrum disorder, children, metacognition, systematic review 
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Introduction 
Autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder 
characterised by: repetitive or restrictive patterns of behaviour, interests or 
activities; deficits in social communication; and deficits in social interaction 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This means that individuals with ASD 
often struggle to develop, maintain, and understand relationships (Travis & 
Sigman, 1998). A well-known theory states that this is due to a cognitive deficit 
that inhibits the development of ‘theory of mind’ in children with ASD (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 2000). This is the ability to assign 
mental states (such as beliefs and intentions) to other people, consequently 
allowing individuals to explain and predict others’ behaviours (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978). In neuro-typical children theory of mind tends to develop 
around three to five years of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). On the 
other hand research has found that those with ASD do not appear to develop 
theory of mind in childhood (Happé, 1994; Mazza et al., 2017), or it is slower to 
develop in this population (Pino et al., 2017). 
 It has been put forward that recognising mental states in others relies on 
the same underlying cognitive mechanism needed to recognise them in 
ourselves (Frith & Happé, 1999). Frith and Happé (1999) argue that people who 
cannot pass theory of mind tests may also be unable to understand their own 
mental states. They theorise that this would mean that individuals with ASD 
have limited self-awareness: the understanding that you are an individual with 
your own thoughts, feelings and beliefs. The only way these individuals can do 
so is by gaining an explicit self-awareness through effortful learning, developing 
an explicit knowledge of their cognitive strengths and weaknesses, which is 
often only achieved by those with high-functioning ASD later in their life (Frith & 
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Happé, 1999). This deficit in self-awareness in those with ASD (Williams, 2010) 
suggests that their metacognition could also be impaired (Carruthers, 2009).  
Metacognition, thinking about thinking, is our ability to think about our 
own cognitive processes (Flavell, 1979). It encompasses both an individuals’ 
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters 
& Afflerbach, 2006). Metacognitive knowledge is a person’s learning and beliefs 
about what affects their thinking ability (Flavell, 1979). Examples of this include 
believing you learn information better by reading it rather than listening to it, and 
knowing that one strategy for learning information is the repetition of said 
information (Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive skills are the cognitive processes that 
an individual employs to monitor and regulate their actions, including their ability 
to predict, monitor and evaluate while carrying out a task (Krasny-Pacini et al., 
2015).  
Models of metacognition are often found in the adult brain injury literature 
(Fleming & Ownsworth, 2006), as components of an individual’s metacognition 
have been linked to the success of rehabilitation (Ownsworth & Clare, 2006). 
One such model has been put forward by Toglia and Kirk (2000). The model 
differentiates between knowledge and beliefs that are pre-existing (in a person’s 
long-term memory), and the knowledge and awareness that is activated when 
the same individual carries out a task. These two separate aspects, termed 
metacognitive knowledge and online awareness in the model, dynamically 
interact with each other as a task is carried out.  
Krasny-Pacini et al. (2015) further extended Toglia and Kirk’s (2000) 
concept of online awareness to include two separate components, termed 
offline awareness and online awareness. These two components were labelled 
collectively as online/emergent awareness. This can be seen in Figure 1. Offline 
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awareness was defined as an individual’s ability to predict and evaluate in 
relation to a task they are carrying out, which happens immediately before and 
after a task. Although offline awareness is activated within the context of the 
task it does not happen while the task is actually being carried out (Krasny-
Pacini et al., 2015). In this paper these emergent awareness skills are referred 
to as predictive and evaluative emergent awareness. On the other hand, 
Krasny-Pacini et al. (2015) termed ‘true’ online awareness as the monitoring of 
performance and error detection that happens during a task. In this paper this is 
known as error detecting emergent awareness.  
 
Figure 1. Krasny-Pacini et al.’s (2015) model of online/emergent awareness, 
which breaks this down into offline and ‘true’ online awareness.  
 
The literature often refers to emergent awareness as individuals’ 
metacognitive skills. In adults, higher abilities in metacognitive skills/emergent 
awareness have been linked to better outcomes after traumatic brain injury 
(Ownsworth & Fleming, 2005) and lower depressive symptoms (Slife & Weaver, 
1992). Research suggests that in children this ability is a strong predictor of 
learning performance (Veenman & Spaans, 2005), in that those with greater 
emergent awareness usually have higher academic achievement (Freeman, 
Karayanidis, & Chalmers, 2017). There may also be a link between this ability 
and anxiety in children, as findings suggest that those with anxiety disorders are 
less confident in their metacognitive skills (Alfano, Beidel, & Turner, 2006; Ellis 
& Hudson, 2010; Smith & Hudson, 2013). Overall these findings suggest that 
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emergent awareness may have an influence on learning and on mental health 
difficulties. 
It has been found that children with ASD have difficulties with school and 
anxiety (Eaves & Ho, 1997; Gillott, Furniss, & Walter, 2001; Kuusikko et al., 
2008), perhaps lending support to the theory that metacognition is impaired in 
individuals with ASD (Carruthers, 2009). From a preliminary search of the 
literature it appears that studies looking at metacognition in children with ASD 
have found mixed results as to whether these children have reduced emergent 
awareness or not (Elmose & Happé, 2014; Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016b; 
McMahon, Henderson, Newell, Jaime, & Mundy, 2016; Wilkinson, Best, 
Minshew, & Strauss, 2010; Wojcik, Allen, Brown & Souchay, 2011). Most of 
these studies appear to explore the predictive or evaluative emergent 
awareness.  
In terms of error detecting emergent awareness, a recent systematic 
review collated the evidence that explored this in children and adults with ASD 
using Event-Related Potentials (ERP) measures (Hüpen, Groen, Gaastra, 
Tucha, & Tucha, 2016). Their finding suggested there was some evidence that 
those with ASD had reduced error detection ability, when comparing those with 
ASD to neurotypical controls (Hüpen et al., 2016). However, there is varying 
evidence of whether ERP measures are able to capture explicit awareness of 
error detection, or if they are also capturing errors that individuals are unaware 
of too (Hester, Foxe, Molholm, Shpaner, & Garavan, 2005; Nieuwenhuis, 
Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 2001). As metacognition is defined as our 
ability to consciously think about our cognitive processes (Hacker, 1998), it 
could be argued that ERP measures may not be an accurate method for 
measuring this. 
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To date there has been no review collating evidence to determine if 
conclusions can be drawn about the overall emergent awareness skills in 
individuals with ASD, specifically children. Therefore, the aim of this literature 
review was to explore the research question: do children with ASD have 
diminished emergent awareness compared to neuro-typical children? The 
definition of emergent awareness was taken from the model put forward by 
Krasny-Pacini et al. (2015), which encompasses the skills of prediction, error 
detection, and evaluation. Due to the finding that ERP measures may be 
measuring errors that participants are unaware of (Hester et al., 2005; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), it was decided to exclude studies that measured 
error-detection in this way. 
Methods 
Search Strategy 
Systematic searches were conducted in the following electronic 
databases: PsycINFO, Ovid Medline, EMBASE, Cochrane library, and Web of 
Science. There was no restriction on publication date and searches were 
completed in December 2018. Reference lists of included studies were 
scrutinized, and citation searches were undertaken on included studies for 
relevant citations. Search criteria were reviewed to ensure these would be 
captured. Grey literature was not used due to time and resource limitations. 
The 2015 PRISMA (Preferred reporting items for systematic review and 
meta-analysis) protocol was followed (Moher et al., 2015) to identify and screen 
records. Records were firstly identified through database searching within the 
title and abstract fields. An initial screening took place using the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. The full-text articles were then assessed for eligibility. At this 
stage a second researcher reviewed and rated six studies. The second 
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researcher made an independent yes/no decision as to whether the study 
should be included or excluded from the review based on the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria and these decisions were discussed with the main reviewer. If 
inter-rater reliability was low then the inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
reviewed and changed, until the raters were in agreement.  
Search Terms  
Search terms were generated from looking at research papers’ keywords 
in the preliminary search of the literature, from speaking to an author in the field, 
and searching for concepts in databases and scanning for alternative words and 
phrases. The search terms used in relation to the research question can be 
seen in Table 1. These are presented by construct. Truncations were used 
where the stem word may have different endings, for example, “autis*” would 
retrieve “autism” and “autistic”.  
 
Table 1 
Search Terms used in the Literature Review  
Construct Search terms 
Emergent awareness ("monitoring impairment" OR "error correction" OR "error 
monitoring" OR metacognit* OR "emergent awareness" OR 
"emergent self awareness" OR "cognitive regulation" OR 
introspection OR metamem* OR "memory awareness" OR 
"online awareness" OR "on task awareness" OR "error 
detection" OR mentalising OR "action memory" OR "judg* of 
confidence" OR "emergent self-awareness" OR "on-task 
awareness" OR "self performance" OR self-performance OR 
"self evaluat*" OR self-evaluat* OR "self understanding" OR 
self-understanding OR "self concept" OR self-concept OR 
"self awareness" OR self-awareness OR "self monitoring" OR 
self-monitoring OR "self perception" OR self-perception) 
AND 
Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder 
(Autis* OR Asperger* OR ASD OR ASC OR 
“Neurodevelopmental disorder*”) 
AND 
Age group (child OR child* OR boy OR girl OR adolesce* OR teen* OR 
youth OR young* OR pupil OR student OR paediatric) 
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Eligibility Criteria 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were outlined using the Population, 
Intervention, Comparator, Outcome, Study design (PICOS) criteria (Centre for 
Reviews and Dissemination, 2006) and are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria used for the Literature Review 
Inclusion Exclusion 
Population 
 Children and adolescents 
between the ages of three and 
eighteen years old.  
 Studies including both children 
and adults if the child data was 
analysed and evaluated 
separately. 
 Non-human subjects. 
Exposure 
 A formal diagnosis of Autistic 
Spectrum Disorder1 (ASD; 
including those with sub-types of 
ASD) by a trained professional 
such as psychiatrist or 
psychologist. 
 
 Children and adolescents with 
traumatic brain injury, 
neurodevelopmental disorders other 
than ASD, or learning disabilities 
(unless as an additional and 
separate comparator group). 
Comparator 
 Typically developing/neurotypical 
children or adolescents (without a 
diagnosis of ASD).  
 The population at different time 
points. 
 No comparator controls used. 
 Those with learning disabilities or 
neurodevelopmental disorders as 
the only comparator group (allowed 
where also a typically 
developing/neurotypical group). 
  Adults. 
Outcome 
 At least one measure of emergent 
awareness/metacognitive skills 
(an individual’s ability to monitor 
and control their own cognitive 
processes; including their ability to 
predict, plan, monitor and 
evaluate while carrying out a task) 
that is self-reported.  
 Behavioural task, which can be 
objectively measured in terms of 
success/failure, alongside the 
metacognitive element. 
 Measures of broad self-awareness 
(conscious knowledge of the self), 
mentalising (how we think about 
ourselves), or metacognitive 
knowledge (an individual’s 
knowledge and beliefs about what 
affects their thinking ability) not in 
relation to metacognitive skills.  
 Measures of metacognitive skills that 
are not self-report, for example, 
teacher or parent report.  
 Error-related potential studies. 
Study Design 
 Quasi-experimental designs.  Qualitative studies. 
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 Longitudinal cohort studies.  
 
 Case studies. 
 Case series. 
 Studies published after 2018.  
 Non-English articles. 
 
Note: 
1
as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013) or the International Classification of Disease (World Health 
Organisation,1992). 
 
Evaluation Criteria  
Articles were evaluated using the Effective Public Health Practice Project 
(EPHPP) Quality Assessment Tool for Quantitative Studies (QATQS; see 
Appendix A; EPHPP, 1998; Thomas, Ciliska, Dobbins, & Micucci, 2004). This 
tool can be used to evaluate a range of different study designs, assessing study 
quality on aspects such as confounders, blinding and data collection methods. 
A second researcher assessed three studies included in the review, using the 
QATQS measure. The QATQS has been found to have good inter-rater 
reliability (Armijo‐Olivo, Stiles, Hagen, Biondo, & Cummings, 2012).  
Results 
A total of 1,247 articles were derived from the search terms across the 
identified databases, reference lists and citation searches of the included 
papers. After duplicates had been deleted, 620 title and abstracts were 
screened against the inclusion and exclusion criteria. Of these, 596 did not 
meet the specified PICOS criteria. Therefore, a total of 24 full-text records were 
assessed for eligibility based on specified inclusion and exclusion criteria. A 
second researcher reviewed and rated six studies (100% inter-rater reliability). 
Fourteen articles were screened out and ten articles were included. Reasons for 
exclusion are provided in Figure 2. Reference lists of the 10 full-text papers 
were reviewed for relevant records and no additional publications were 
identified. The 10 records were evaluated using the QATQS measure. An 
independent reviewer completed the QATQS for three included records (100% 
18 
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inter-rater reliability). All included studies used quasi-experimental designs, 
comparing typically developing participants with those with ASD. 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of the Literature Search Strategy and Eligibility Screening. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Records 
identified via 
Cochrane 
review: 13 
Records 
identified via 
Web of 
Science: 294 
Records 
identified via 
PsycINFO: 
484 
Records 
identified via 
Ovid 
Medline: 206 
Records 
identified via 
EMBASE: 
250 
Records: 1,247 
Records screened after 
duplicates removed: 620 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility: 24 
Records excluded on 
title and abstract: 596 
14 full-text articles did 
not meet the inclusion 
criteria: 3 used ASD 
participants who did not 
have formal diagnoses; 
1 measure used was not 
self-report; 8 were not 
measures of emergent 
awareness; and 2 had 
no objective measure of 
metacognition. 
Studies included for 
synthesis: 10 
Duplicates removed: 
627 
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Table 3 
Summary of Eligible Studies from the Literature Search Strategy and Eligibility Screening. 
 
Author Sample Measures  Results and Conclusion Evaluation QATQS 
Brosnan et 
al. (2016) 
26 participants 
with ASD (21 
males; age M = 
13.7 years, SD = 
1.3) vs 56 TD 
participants (16 
males; age M = 
10.5 years, SD = 
0.5). ASD 
participants were 
matched with TD 
participants 
working at same 
mathematics level.   
Participants were individually given 
15 mathematics questions in sets of 
five. The first five questions were 
always level one and then became 
more difficult (level two, level three) 
depending on if participants made 
errors or not. After each question 
participants were asked whether they 
thought they had got the answer 
correct or not (possible answers: 
right, wrong, don't know), to assess if 
they were aware when they had 
made errors.  
The two groups did not differ 
significantly on the number of correct 
responses to the questions, t(31.89) = 
1.7, ns. Participants with ASD reported 
more incorrect answers as correct, t(60) 
= 1.81, p < .05, d = .53. The authors put 
this forward as evidence that children 
with ASD are significantly worse at 
evaluating their answers compared to 
TD children, suggesting they have 
diminished evaluative emergent 
awareness.   
Strengths: Age 
and IQ were 
included in the 
analysis and 
found not to be 
impacting the 
results. 
Limitations: 
matching of the 
samples, gender 
ratio differed 
between groups. 
A - 
moderate 
B - 
moderate 
C - 
moderate 
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
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Elmose & 
Happé 
(2014) 
24 participants 
with ASD (age M = 
13.4 years, SD = 
1.5) vs 21 TD 
participants (age M 
= 10.1 years, SD = 
2.5). All 
participants were 
male and matched 
on VMA. 
Participants were individually given 
memory tasks where they had to 
remember sequences of pictures (2 
trials = buildings, 2 trials = faces). 
There were PJA’s (how many 
pictures they thought they would be 
able to place/have placed in the 
same order?) at three time points: 
before, after a distracter task and 
after participants had to recall the 
sequences A visual scale from 0 - 6 
was shown to help them answer. 
Participants were also asked a JOC 
question at the end of the task (how 
sure they were of each of the 
pictures). The answers were totally 
sure, pretty sure, or unsure. 
A repeated measures ANOVA showed 
a significant difference between PJA at 
the three time-points, F(1.75) = 10.4, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .20, but was non-
significant for group effect. Chi-square 
analysis showed a trend that those with 
ASD had higher PJA on building trials 
and those without ASD had higher PJA 
on face trials (p = .06, d = .60). Another 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
differences between the trials for the 
JOC, F(3) = 4.3, p = .006, ηp2 = .09, but 
no effect of group. This suggests that 
children with ASD have similar 
predictive and evaluative emergent 
awareness as TD children. 
Strengths: 
Participants 
were matched 
on VMA, task 
adapted from a 
previous one. 
Limitations: 
Small sample 
size, differences 
in ages between 
groups. 
A - 
moderate 
B - 
moderate 
C - 
moderate 
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
Grainger, 
Williams & 
Lind 
(2016a). 
Exp 2.  
22 participants 
with ASD (19 
males; age M = 
13.70 years, SD = 
1.45) vs 21 TD 
participants (19 
males; age M = 
13.21 years, SD = 
1.18). Participants 
were equated 
closely on VIQ, 
PIQ, FSIQ and 
chronological age. 
Participants were shown two sets of 
22 word pairs, each consisting of a 
cue word and a target word. Each 
pair was presented for 8 s each. 
Then they were presented with either 
the cue word alone (cue alone 
condition), or both the cue and 
targets words (cue-target condition), 
in a fixed random order and asked 
"will you remember the target word at 
a later point?" (JOL). Immediately 
afterwards they completed a cued-
recall test where they were asked to 
recall the missing target word pair 
from each cue word. 
There were no significant differences 
between groups in performance, in 
either the cue alone condition, t(41) = 
0.65, p = .517, d = .24, or the cue-target 
condition, t(41) = 0.33, p = .739, d = 
.14.  There were also no significant 
differences in JOL in the cue alone 
condition, t(41) = 0.67, p = .505, d = 
.25, and the cue-target condition, t(41) 
= 0.56, p = .582, d = .19, between 
participants with ASD and TD 
participants. These findings suggest 
children with ASD have similar 
predictive emergent awareness as TD 
children. 
Strengths: task 
based on one 
used previously, 
participants 
were closely 
equated on IQ 
and age. 
Limitations: 
does not 
disclosure the 
recruitment 
procedure for 
participants with 
ASD, small 
sample size, low 
power. 
A - 
moderate 
B - 
moderate 
C - strong  
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
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Grainger, 
Williams & 
Lind 
(2016b) 
32 participants 
with ASD (age M = 
13.59 years, SD = 
1.36) vs 30 TD 
participants (age M 
= 13.27 years, SD 
= 1.06). Gender 
ratio not reported. 
The groups were 
closely equated on 
age and verbal 
and non-verbal 
ability (using the 
WASI). 
Participants watched an informative 
video and were then asked 16 
questions about what they had seen. 
Afterwards answering the 16 
questions they were given JOC 
questions for each one on a seven 
point Likert scale. They were asked 
to rate how confident they were in 
their answers (from extremely unsure 
to extremely sure). Finally, at a later 
point participants were given the 
opportunity to cross out any of their 
answers they believed were 
incorrect.   
There were no significant differences 
between the amount of answers each 
group recalled, t(60) = 0.57, p = .57, d = 
.13. However, participants with ASD 
had significantly less accurate JOC 
scores than TD participants, t(60) = 
1.75, p = .043, d = .41. They also relied 
on their JOC ratings less when deciding 
what answers to cross out, t = 2.43, p = 
.018, d = .64. These findings suggest 
children with ASD have diminished 
evaluative emergent awareness 
compared to TD children. 
Strengths: larger 
sample size 
than other 
studies, 
participants 
were closely 
equated on IQ 
and age, task 
based on one 
previously used. 
Limitations: 
recruitment 
procedure not 
reported. 
A - weak 
B - 
moderate 
C - weak 
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
Maras, 
Gamble, & 
Brosnan 
(2019; first 
published 
2017). 
40 participants 
with ASD (30 
males; age M = 
13.33 years, SD = 
1.25) vs 95 TD 
participants (58 
males; age M = 
13.40 years, SD = 
1.15). No 
differences in age 
across groups, 
however, 
participants with 
ASD were under-
achieving in maths 
(stated this was 
reflective of the 
ASD population).  
Participants took part in a computer 
programmed ‘math challenge’, where 
they were asked maths questions on 
a computer. This was a novel task 
created for the study. Afterwards 
participants completed a 5-point 
Likert scale JOC, from I'm sure I got 
it right to I'm sure I got it wrong. Half 
of the participants received feedback 
after each question (feedback 
condition), and the other half did not 
(no feedback condition). Participants 
were also asked intention questions 
before and after, which are not 
reported here. 
A 2(Group) x 2 (Condition: Feedback vs 
No Feedback) x 2 (Answer: correct vs 
incorrect) mixed ANOVA explored if 
participants assigned higher confidence 
to correct rather than incorrect answers. 
This revealed a main effect of Group, 
F(1, 120) = 4.15, p = .04, ηp2 = .03: 
participants with ASD were significantly 
more confident that their answers were 
correct than the TD group. However, 
there was no group x answer 
interaction, F(1, 120) = 0.59, p = .45, 
ηp2 = .005, showing both groups had 
higher confidence for correct rather 
than incorrect answers. This suggests 
children with ASD have similar 
evaluative emergent awareness to TD 
children.    
Strengths: good 
number of 
participants, 
ecologically 
valid measure. 
Limitations: 
groups were not 
IQ matched, 
maths ability 
was assessed 
by teachers 
before testing 
rather than as 
an independent 
measure, ‘maths 
challenge’ 
measure a novel 
task. 
A - 
moderate 
B - 
moderate 
C - strong  
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
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McMahon, 
Henderson, 
Newell, 
Jaime, & 
Mundy 
(2016). 
28 participants 
with ASD (24 
males; age M = 
13.47 years, SD = 
2.79) vs 31 TD 
participants (16 
males; age M = 
14.56 years, SD = 
1.61). No 
significant 
differences 
between the 
groups on age, 
VIQ, PIQ, or 
gender distribution. 
Participants were shown face stimuli 
that gradually appeared on screen 
and were asked to guess the 
emotion the face was displaying as 
quickly as possible. Every time they 
guessed they were also asked to 
give a JOC on a 5-point Likert scale 
from very unconfident to very 
confident. The face stimulus was 
then revealed in whole and 
participants were asked if they would 
like to change their affect answer 
and if they did, give another JOC 
rating.  
Hierarchical linear modelling assessed 
whether metacognition was associated 
with performance. This revealed 
participants were more confident for 
correct affect selection, t(48) = 7.07, p < 
.01. Confidence was a stronger 
predictor of accuracy for TD 
participants than those with ASD, as 
there was an interaction between 
confidence and group, t(48) = -3.46, p < 
.01. TD participants had a stronger 
relationship between confidence and 
accuracy than participants with ASD, 
suggesting they had better evaluative 
emergent awareness.  
Strengths: 
Hierarchical 
linear modelling 
allowed 
demographic 
factors to be 
included in the 
analysis.  
Limitations: 
unknown if the 
measure used 
was based on a 
previous study. 
A - 
moderate 
B - 
moderate 
C - strong  
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
Williams, 
Bergström, 
& Grainger 
(2018). Exp 
2. 
11 participants 
with ASD (10 
males; age M = 
9.86 years, SD = 
1.69) vs 11 TD 
participants (8 
males; age M = 
9.86 years, SD = 
1.00). The groups 
did not differ 
significantly on 
age, VIQ or PIQ. 
In an initial test phase, participants 
were asked 50 general knowledge 
questions on a computer and given 
an unlimited amount of time to 
provide an answer. If they were 
unsure of the answer they were told 
to guess. Once they had typed an 
answer they were asked to give a 
JOC using a sliding scale from 0 (not 
confident) to 100 (confident) for each 
question. Afterwards participants 
completed a re-test phase, where 
they were given a surprise re-test of 
answers they got incorrect. They did 
not provide JOC ratings during this 
phase. 
A 2 (Group) x 2 (Test period: initial 
test/retest) revealed a main effect of 
group F(1, 20) = 5.04, p = .04, ηp2 = 
.20. TD participants performed better 
on the general knowledge questions 
that those with ASD. Participants with 
ASD had significantly less accurate 
JOC scores than TD participants, t(20) 
= 2.00, p < .05, d = .86. This suggests 
children with ASD have diminished 
evaluative emergent awareness when 
compared to TD children.  
Strengths: 
sample was 
matched by age 
and IQ, 
questions used 
were age 
appropriate. 
Limitations: 
small sample 
size, novel task 
not used 
previously, TD 
participants 
performed 
significantly 
better on the 
task than those 
with ASD. 
A - weak 
B - 
moderate 
C - weak 
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
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Wojcik, 
Allen, 
Brown, & 
Souchay 
(2011) 
16 participants 
with ASD (14 
males; age M = 
11.55 years, SD = 
2.06) vs 16 TD 
participants (11 
males; age M = 
10.95 years, SD = 
3.0). There were 
no differences on 
age and IQ across 
groups. 
Instruction sequence-action task 
where participants were given 
sequences of instructions (between 
two & five in sequence length) to 
remember and carry out (e.g. (1) pick 
up the red ruler (2) and put it in the 
blue box. Five trials were carried out 
for each sequence length and after 
each they were asked to give a JOC 
(how well do you think you did in this 
task?) on a 10 point scale from 'I did 
not do very well' to 'I did very well'. 
Three encoding conditions were 
tested for each participant: 
instructions only; instructions read 
and acted by the experimenter; and 
read by the experimenter and acted 
by the participants.  
A 2 (group) x 3 (condition) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of group, F(1, 
30) = 8.29, p < .01, ηp2 = .22 
suggesting participants with ASD had 
poorer memory performance than TD 
participants. There were no significant 
differences in JOC’s between the two 
groups, F(1, 30) = 3.48, p = .072, ηp2 = 
.10, or in the accuracy of the 
confidence judgments, F(1, 30) = 1.74, 
p = .20, ηp2 = .05. Participants with 
ASD made similar JOCs as the TD 
participants and were no less reliable in 
the accuracy of their judgments. These 
findings suggest children with ASD do 
not have diminished evaluative 
emergent awareness compared to TD 
children. 
Strengths: the 
task used was 
based on a 
previous 
measure. 
Limitations: 
small sample 
size, TD 
participants 
performed 
significantly 
better on the 
task, unclear 
what 
calculations 
were performed 
on the data 
before ANOVAs 
carried out. 
A - 
moderate 
B - 
moderate 
C - strong  
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
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Wojcik, 
Moulin & 
Souchay 
(2013). 
18 participants 
with ASD (16 
males; age M = 
12.60 years, SD = 
2.14) vs 19 TD 
participants (13 
males; age M = 
11.83 years, SD = 
2.57). No group 
differences in age, 
VIQ and FSIQ, but 
a difference 
approaching 
significance in VIQ 
(therefore, this was 
used as a 
covariate in 
analysis). 
Episodic FOK task: participants were 
presented with 20 word pairs (a cue 
word and a target word; on a laptop 
for 5sec each pair) and told their 
memory for these pairs would be 
tested later. Next participants were 
given cue words and asked to recall 
the target words. At this stage they 
were asked if they would be able to 
detect the target word amongst 
others (FOK judgment) with possible 
answers being 'yes' or 'no'. 
Afterwards a recognition test was 
given.   
Episodic FOK task: a 2 (group) x 2 
(prediction: yes/no) ANOVA revealed 
no significant main effect of group, F(1, 
34) = 1.14, ns, ηp2 = .049, but a 
significant interaction, F(1, 22) = 5.44, p 
< .02, ηp2 = .198. Within-group t-tests 
showed TD participants were more 
accurate in their Yes/No FOK prediction 
judgments (recognition for Yes 
judgments higher than for No 
judgments), t(13) =  3.14, p < .001, d = 
.777 whereas this was not significant 
for the ASD condition, t(11) = 0.05, n.s., 
d = .007.  This suggests those with 
ASD are less accurate on prediction 
tasks than TD children, specifically 
tasks of episodic memory.  
Strengths: tasks 
based on those 
used previously 
to investigate 
semantic and 
episodic FOK. 
Limitations: 
limited to yes/no 
answers on the 
task, using VIQ 
as a covariate 
was not 
statistically 
appropriate 
(Miller & 
Chapman, 
2001). 
A - weak 
B - 
moderate 
C - strong  
D - weak 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
Semantic FOK task: 40 target words 
with corresponding pictures. 
Participants were given each of the 
words and asked to define them. 
They were told these words would be 
presented later as pictures and 
asked to make a FOK yes/no 
judgment. They then took part in a 
recognition test. 
Semantic FOK task: a 2 (group) x 2 
(prediction: yes/no) ANOVA found no 
significant effect of group, F(1, 34) =  
0.00, n.s., ηp2 = .001. No interaction 
was found, F(1, 29) = 1.09, n.s., ηp2 = 
.036, indicating that children with ASD 
could predict their future recognition 
using FOK judgments. This suggests 
there are no differences in predictive 
emergent awareness between children 
with and without ASD on tasks of 
semantic memory. 
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Wojcik, 
Waterman, 
Lestie, 
Moulin, & 
Souchay 
(2014). Exp 
1. 
21 participants 
with ASD (18 
males; age M = 
12.77 years, SD = 
2.34) vs 21 TD 
participants (17 
males; age M = 
11.64 years, SD = 
2.49). No 
differences in age, 
PIQ, FSIQ or 
receptive 
vocabulary across 
groups.  
 
Participants were given 12 word 
pairs to remember (presented for 8 s 
each) and then given an immediate 
(straight away) or delayed (2 mins 
later) JOL task (will you be able to 
recall the target word when you are 
shown the cue word? Yes/No). 
Afterwards they were asked to recall 
the word pairs.  
 
A 2 (group) x 2 (condition: 
immediate/delayed recall) ANOVA 
revealed no significant group difference 
in recall performance, F(1, 40) = 0.002, 
p = .97, ηp2 = .001. There was no 
difference between groups in terms of 
level of prediction, F(1, 40) = 0.18, p = 
.678, ηp2 = .004. A 2 (group) x 2 
(condition) ANOVA exploring relative 
accuracy of JOL revealed no significant 
differences in judgment of learning 
accuracy between those with and 
without ASD, F(1, 40) = 1.51, p = .23, 
ηp2 = .03. There was a significant effect 
of condition, F(1, 40) = 84.97, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .68, suggesting that across both 
groups immediate JOL were less 
accurate than delayed ones. These 
findings suggest no differences in 
predictive emergent awareness 
between children with and without ASD. 
 
Strengths: 
groups matched 
on age and IQ, 
tasks based 
somewhat on 
previous 
research. 
Limitations: 
specific sample 
of those with 
ASD, as it was 
children who 
had a diagnosis 
of Asperger's or 
high-functioning 
autism. 
A - 
moderate 
B - weak 
C - strong  
D - 
moderate 
E - weak F 
- N/A 
Global: 
Weak  
Note:  
1
Articles that contain other participant conditions that were not described. ASD = Autistic Spectrum Disorder, TD = Typically Developing, M = mean, SD = 
Standard Deviation, QAT = Quality Assessment Tool, JOC = Judgment Of Confidence, FOK = Feeling Of Knowing, JOL = Judgment Of Learning, PJA = 
Performance Judgment Accuracy; IQ = Intelligence Quotient, BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale, VIQ = Verbal IQ, VMA = Verbal Mental Age, PIQ = 
Performance IQ, FSIQ = Full Scale IQ, SRS = Social Responsiveness Scale, WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, ANOVA = Analysis of Variance.  
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Critical Summary 
All of the ten articles included in this literature review report quasi-
experimental studies comparing typically developing children and those with 
ASD on tasks of emergent awareness. The studies looked at offline emergent 
awareness (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015): the thinking about a task that happens 
before (prediction) and after (evaluation) the particular task is carried out. No 
included studies measured ‘true’ online emergent awareness (Krasny-Pacini et 
al., 2015), or error detection, which occurs while a task is being carried out. 
  Overall the studies were assessed as having weak global quality ratings 
according to the QATQS tool (Thomas et al., 2004). For a global rating of ‘weak’ 
the paper has to have at least two weak ratings on the six sub-sections. All 
articles had weaknesses in blinding and data collection. They did not report if 
the researchers were aware of what group the participants were in when 
carrying out testing, whether the participants were aware of the research 
question, and if the tasks used were valid and reliable. This resulted in these 
two sub-sections (blinding and data collection) consistently being rated as weak 
across the ten articles. Another limitation was that they did not usually report the 
drop-out rate of participants at the time of sign-up, so it is unclear how many 
were approached and how many of those did not wish to take part. This could 
have led to a certain sub-section of the population taking part in the study, 
which could have influenced results. 
Of the ten included articles, three looked at predictive emergent 
awareness, six looked at evaluative emergent awareness, and one looked at 
both. Children who took part in the studies were between the ages of nine and 
fourteen years old, and the majority of studies matched participants on age and 
IQ. This calls in to question whether the children with ASD were a true 
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representation of the population, or if they were more likely to be those with 
high-functioning ASD, as it is often these individuals that have a similar IQ to 
their peers (Siegel, Minshew, & Goldstein, 1996). More males took part in the 
studies than females; however, it could be argued that this is representative of 
those with ASD (Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017). 
Predictive Emergent Awareness 
Wojcik, Moulin and Souchay (2013) explored participants’ predictive 
emergent awareness using tasks that involved semantic (general knowledge) 
and episodic (word pairs) knowledge. They believed they would find that 
children with ASD performed worse than typically developing controls on a 
prediction task involving episodic, but not semantic, materials. This would 
provide evidence for the view put forward by Powell and Jordan (1993), which 
states that individuals with ASD have a specific cognitive deficit that means they 
are unable to encode information subjective to them. Wojcik et al.’s (2013) 
results supported this, as they only found significant differences in performance 
between typically developing children and those with ASD on the episodic task. 
On the other hand children with ASD performed as well as typically developing 
children on the semantic task. The authors suggested this was evidence that 
children with ASD cannot put themselves into the past to retrieve information, 
as the episodic task (unlike the semantic task) relied on the skill of children 
mentally going back and thinking about when they learned the information.  
However, another research study, using a similar episodic task, does not 
appear to support these findings. Grainger, Williams, and Lind (2016a) also 
gave participants target-cue word pairs to learn, judgments of learning, and then 
asked them to recall the target words. Although the pattern of results suggested 
children with ASD were less accurate than typically developing children on the 
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judgments of learning, unlike Wojcik et al.’s (2013) study, these differences 
were not significant and the effect sizes were small. Both studies used similar 
age groups, numbers of participants, matched on aspects of IQ, and performed 
a similar data analysis. It is, therefore, unclear why there is a difference in the 
results. 
Other research seems to support the findings of Grainger et al. (2016a) 
that there are no differences in predictive emergent awareness between 
children with and without ASD (Elmose & Happé, 2014; Wojcik, Waterman, 
Lestie, Moulin, & Souchay, 2014). Elmose and Happé (2014) explored 
prediction by asking participants to remember sequences of pictures (which 
were sequences of faces or buildings), and asking how many pictures they 
would remember in the same order. Interestingly performance judgments given 
by children with ASD were more accurate than typically developing children for 
the building sequence trials. However, a limitation of this study is that it did not 
match on age; therefore, the typically developing children appeared to be 
younger (age M = 10.1 years, SD = 2.5) than those with ASD (age M = 13.4, SD 
= 1.5). Previous research with typically developing children has found 
metacognition develops throughout childhood and adolescence (Kuhn, 2000; 
Weil et al., 2013), so the younger age group may have had less developed 
metacognition, which could have meant the different findings were due to age 
differences. 
 Overall the included studies in the review suggest that children with ASD 
do not have diminished predictive emergent awareness compared to those 
without ASD. Although three studies found a similar pattern that children with 
ASD performed worse on tasks of prediction (Grainger et al., 2016a; Wojcik et 
al., 2013; Wojcik et al., 2014), these were usually non-significant differences 
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and effect sizes were small. Only one study found a significant difference, on an 
episodic task (Wojcik et al., 2013). The other included study (Elmose & Happé, 
2014) found evidence that on a particular task children with ASD performed 
better at prediction than typically developing controls. These findings suggest 
that overall children with ASD can perform as well as typically developing 
children on tasks where they have to predict their performance on a task.  
Evaluative Emergent Awareness 
 The majority of studies identified by the review explored participants’ 
ability to evaluate a task that they had completed, all using measures known as 
judgments of confidence. These measures involve participants completing a 
main task (such as answering questions or following sequences of instructions) 
and then being asked how well they thought they completed the task or how 
confident they were in their given answers. Out of the seven articles that 
explored participants’ evaluative emergent awareness, four supported the 
hypothesis that this ability is diminished in children with ASD compared to 
typically developing controls (Brosnan et al., 2016 Grainger et al., 2016b; 
McMahon et al., 2016; Williams, Bergström, & Grainger, 2018). Effect sizes for 
these studies, where reported, ranged from small to large. This suggests there 
was a lack of consistency in the results across studies that found significant 
effects.  
Three of the studies reviewed found no differences in evaluative 
emergent awareness skills between children with ASD and typically developing 
children (Elmose & Happé, 2014; Maras, Gamble, & Brosnan, 2019; Wojcik et 
al., 2011). These studies, similar to those that had found significant effects, 
used main tasks such as maths questions, a memory task, and instruction 
sequences. This indicates that it was perhaps not a difference in task design 
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that led to the difference in results. Also, looking at the means and standard 
deviations of these studies there did not appear to be a clear direction of the 
results between children with and without ASD, suggesting it was not under-
powered studies affecting the results (Elmose & Happé, 2014; Maras et al., 
2019; Wojcik et al., 2011). These studies seem to suggest that participants with 
ASD can perform as well as typically developing participants.  
A limitation when trying to look at the overall results of the studies is that 
there was variability in the way participants could answer the judgments of 
confidence. Some studies provided set answers that the participants had to 
choose between (for example, ‘right’, ‘wrong’ and ‘don’t know’ in Brosnan et al., 
2016), whereas others provided Likert scales and asked participants to choose 
a number (for example, on a 10 point scale from 'I did not do very well' to 'I did 
very well' in Wojcik et al., 2011). Even the studies that all used Likert scales 
varied in the number of points on the scale and what each end of the scale 
meant. This makes the findings vulnerable to altering interpretations; therefore, 
they could be less valid than if similar measures were used. 
It appears that there is evidence that both supports and provides 
evidence against children with ASD having diminished evaluative emergent 
awareness. Although the QATQS tool has poor precision, overall the findings 
from it suggest that none of the studies were rigorous and the differing results 
do not appear to be due to differences highlighted by this tool. The three studies 
that had slightly higher ratings on individual components (Maras et al., 2019; 
McMahon et al., 2016; Wojcik et al., 2011) did not have similar results. 
Therefore, it appears that no clear conclusion can be drawn from the studies 
investigating evaluative emergent awareness in children with and without ASD.  
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Discussion 
The aim of this literature review was to explore if children with ASD have 
diminished emergent awareness compared to neuro-typical children. Emergent 
awareness consists of the abilities individuals use to monitor and regulate tasks 
they are carrying out (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015). The model put forward by 
Krasny-Pacini et al. (2015) splits emergent awareness into online and offline 
awareness. Online awareness is the ability to monitor task performance and 
detect errors while the task is being carried out. The literature review did not 
include any studies that investigated this aspect of emergent awareness in 
children with ASD. This may have been due to the search criteria as it did not 
include ERP measures, which have been found to show differences between 
children with ASD and neuro-typical controls on error detection (Hüpen et al., 
2016). However, these were excluded due to the evidence that ERP measures 
capture errors that participants are unaware of, as well as the ones that they are 
aware of (Hester et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). 
In terms of offline awareness (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015), the included 
studies looked at prediction and evaluation. The results from three studies 
appear to suggest that children with ASD perform as well as controls on 
measures where they have to predict their performance on a task (Elmose & 
Happé, 2014; Grainger et al., 2016a; Wojcik et al., 2014). Also, some of the 
articles that explored the evaluative emergent awareness suggested children 
with ASD performed as well on judgments of confidence as those without ASD 
(Elmose & Happé, 2014; Maras et al., 2019; Wojcik et al., 2011). This shows 
that, in at least some instances, children with ASD do not have reduced ability 
compared to children without ASD.  
These findings do not support the theory that the cognitive mechanism 
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required to attribute mental states to others may also be responsible for 
attributing mental states to the self in ASD (Frith & Happé, 1999; Williams, 
2010). It has been well-researched that children with ASD have poor theory of 
mind (Mazza et al., 2017). Frith and Happé (1999) put forward the theory that 
an individuals’ ability to attribute mental states to others is closely related to the 
same individuals’ ability to attribute mental states to themselves. Therefore, the 
neuro-cognitive deficit responsible for children’s lack of theory of mind in ASD 
may also contribute to their lack of metacognitive self-awareness. Yet included 
studies have shown that, particularly for prediction tasks, children with ASD 
perform as well as typically developing children. This suggests that perhaps the 
theory that there is one underlying mechanism for both theory of mind and 
metacognition is too simplistic. 
Further support for a more complex model of metacognition in children 
with ASD come from additional included studies showing a difference in the 
ability of children with and without ASD on measures of evaluation (Brosnan et 
al., 2016; McMahon et al., 2016; Grainger et al., 2016b; Williams et al., 2018) 
and prediction (Wojcik et al., 2013). These findings suggest that perhaps some 
children with ASD have diminished offline emergent awareness, but that others 
do not. It may be that metacognitive abilities are individualised and also distinct 
from one another, with potentially separate underlying mechanisms that may or 
may not be affected in ASD. 
However, overall the results need to be interpreted with caution due to 
the limitations of the studies. Most suffered from small participant numbers, 
suggesting they may not have been powered to find differences. Where 
differences were found, although these were statistically significant, they may 
not have been clinically significant differences that would lead to problems in 
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children’s functioning. Studies also used a specific age group of children (nine 
to fourteen years old) and so it is unknown if these findings would be similar in a 
younger or older sample.         
Clinical Implications 
The variability of findings suggests that it would be important to assess 
metacognition in children with ASD to determine their individual metacognitive 
profile. This would require multiple measures to capture the complexity of 
metacognition and determine if the child had weaknesses in specific areas of 
metacognition, for example, evaluative emergent awareness. It may be that 
measures need to be developed that look at clinically significant difficulties, 
rather than purely ones that show differences between children with ASD and 
typically developing children. This would help to tailor interventions as well.    
These findings would also be clinically important for children’s learning 
and education. It has been found that individuals with better metacognition can 
more accurately determine what they need to learn and implement guided 
strategies that allow them to study easier material first (Metcalfe, 2009). Some 
of the studies included in the review suggest children with ASD have poorer 
emergent awareness evaluative ability (Brosnan et al., 2016 Grainger et al., 
2016b; McMahon et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2018). This suggests they could 
perhaps skip learning material thinking they already know and may not always 
be able to determine what they should learn first. This would have an impact on 
their learning and academic achievement. It has been found that children with 
high-functioning ASD perform worse academically than their intellectual ability 
predicts (Estes, Rivera, Bryan, Cali, & Dawson, 2011). Therefore, it may be that 
school interventions teaching the use of metacognitive strategies to children 
with ASD are required. For example, in Maras et al.’s (2017) study they found 
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that providing feedback increased the accuracy of judgments,  suggesting these 
types of interventions may be beneficial for children with ASD. 
Limitations 
One limitation of the literature review is that grey literature was not 
searched. Another is that studies looking at this research area may have been 
excluded due to the strict search terms and criteria on children with ASD 
requiring a formal diagnosis. This excluded participant groups with ‘autism-like’ 
features, which may have added to the results. 
Another limitation of the studies overall was the amount of variation in the 
tasks used, how constructs were measured, analysis strategies and the findings 
across studies. This made it difficult to synthesise the results. One way this was 
overcome was to divide the results by predictive and evaluative emergent 
awareness abilities. However, even within these two different groups of results 
there was a lot of variability making it difficult to come to clear conclusions. 
Although performing a meta-analysis on the data could be beneficial to help 
with this issue, it may be that the methods are not consistent enough. 
Therefore, if one was carried out in the future it would be recommended that a 
measure of heterogeneity, such as I2 (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 
2003) was used. 
Future Research 
 The literature review highlighted that the majority of studies recruit 
children within a specific age category for their research. Children were 
between the ages of nine and fourteen. It may be that different results would be 
found if younger or older children took part, as it has been found metacognition 
develops throughout childhood and adolescence (Kuhn, 2000; Weil et al., 
2013). This would enable the development of metacognition in children with 
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ASD to be studied, as it could be that metacognition in these individuals have 
an altered developmental trajectory. 
 The literature review has also highlighted that there appears to be a lack 
of studies investigating error detection in children with ASD. This is the online 
emergent awareness ability that monitors and regulates performance as a task 
is being carried out (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015). There appears to be a need to 
develop tasks that measure when children are consciously aware they are 
making a mistake when carrying out a task, due to the limitations of ERP 
studies (Hester et al., 2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). These tasks would need 
to be suitable for children with ASD as well as neuro-typical controls. 
Conclusion 
This aim of this literature review was to explore whether children with 
ASD have diminished emergent awareness compared to those without ASD. 
Systematic searches across five databases resulted in ten articles being 
included in the review. These articles looked at children’s predictive and 
evaluative emergent awareness, but not their error detection. The findings 
indicate that children with ASD could predict as well as typically developing 
children, but a more mixed picture emerged about their ability to evaluate their 
performance on a task. It highlights the need for further research to explore the 
development of metacognition in children with ASD. 
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Abstract 
Objective: Metacognition can be defined as an individual’s knowledge and 
beliefs about their thinking abilities (metacognitive knowledge) as well as the 
cognitive processes that monitor and regulate their actions (metacognitive 
skills). The current study explored children’s metacognitive skills of prediction, 
error detection, and evaluation (known as emergent awareness), and how these 
relate to their subjective metacognitive knowledge, in younger (M = 7.55, SD = 
0.56) and older children (age M = 11.14, SD = 0.35). 
Methods: 135 participants (68 in the younger group), recruited from one 
Secondary School and two Primary Schools, were individually tested on 
measures of prediction, error detection and evaluation. They also completed a 
metacognitive knowledge questionnaire measuring their subjective awareness 
about their learning. 
Results: Independent t-tests found significant differences between younger and 
older participants’ predictive, error detecting, and evaluative emergent 
awareness. The differences suggested older children were more accurate than 
younger children on tasks of prediction and error detection but not evaluation. 
Older participants also scored significantly lower on the subjective 
metacognitive knowledge questionnaire, suggesting younger participants were 
more confident in their skills and strategies for learning. Correlation analysis 
found no relationships between the three emergent awareness abilities and 
metacognitive knowledge at either age, and only a significant difference 
between the prediction and evaluation correlation coefficients between age 
groups, suggesting the relationship between these abilities becomes weaker as 
children get older.  
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Conclusion: This study provides support for the hypotheses that emergent 
awareness skills become more accurate as children get older, but only for error 
detection and prediction tasks. Younger children are more confident in their 
learning and the strategies they use to learn. The results also suggest that all of 
these abilities are different from each other and may become more 
differentiated as children get older. 
Keywords: Children, metacognition, emergent awareness. 
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Introduction 
Metacognition was first defined as individuals’ knowledge and regulation 
of their cognitions in relation to their learning (Flavell, 1979). Since then the 
area of research has expanded and there is now a variety of terms used to 
define and describe metacognition (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 
2006), but it is essentially our ability to consciously reflect on our thoughts and 
behaviour (Metcalfe, 1996). One aspect of metacognition is an individual’s 
metacognitive knowledge: our thoughts and beliefs about how we learn and 
what affects it (Flavell, 1979). In one model metacognition also encompasses 
emergent awareness, which is used while carrying out tasks to monitor and 
regulate what we are doing (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015). It includes skills such 
as our abilities to predict, error detect, and evaluate our performance on the 
specific task (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015). Basic metacognition has been 
observed in children as young as three years old (Bernard, Proust, & Clément, 
2015; Coughlin, Hembacher, Lyons, & Ghetti, 2015) and it continues to develop 
through childhood (Kuhn, 2000) and adolescence to adulthood (Weil et al., 
2013).  
Metacognition is considered part of, or at least closely linked to, 
executive functions (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000); the brain’s 
control system responsible for actions such as self-regulation, goal setting, 
reasoning, and problem solving (Anderson, 2002). Therefore, similar to 
executive functions, metacognition may be clinically important for children who 
have neurodevelopmental disorders (Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016; Shen, 
Tsai, & Duann, 2011) and health conditions that affect cognition (Kizony, Tau, 
Bar, & Yeger, 2014). Indeed, studies have found that children with autistic 
spectrum disorder may have diminished metacognitive ability (Brosnan et al., 
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2016; Grainger et al., 2016; Williams, Bergström, & Grainger, 2018) and those 
with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) appear to struggle with 
error detection (Liotti, Pliszka, Perez, Kothmann, & Woldorff, 2005; Shen et al., 
2011) when compared to neuro-typical children. There is also evidence 
suggesting that children with brain injury have poorer metacognition than 
controls (Josman, Berney, & Jarus, 2000; Kizony et al., 2014). It would, 
therefore, be important when working with these populations to consider these 
possible deficits and their effects.  
Another area where there has been interest in children’s metacognition is 
education (Quigley, Muijs, & Stringer, 2018). The results of some studies have 
suggested that children with higher levels of metacognition may learn better 
(Desoete, Roeyers, & Buysse, 2001; Özsoy, 2011; Veenman, Wilhelm, & 
Beishuizen, 2004). This has led to guidance being published outlining methods 
schools and teachers can use to increase their students’ metacognitive abilities, 
in hopes that it increases educational attainment as well (Quigleyet al., 2018). 
However, other research has highlighted that not all aspects of metacognition 
develop in a straightforward linear way (Karably & Zabrucky, 2017; Schneider, 
2008) and that cognitive immaturity may be beneficial for children in the long 
term (Bjorklund, 2018). 
Bjorklund (2018) puts forward an argument from an evolutionary 
developmental psychological perspective that children’s cognitions at different 
stages in their development are adaptive for their environment, helping them to 
deal with their current context, rather than being cognitive limitations that need 
to be overcome. In terms of metacognition, poor metacognitive knowledge and 
skills in early childhood may be adaptive (Bjorklund & Green, 1992) and result 
in long-term benefits (Bjorklund, Periss, & Causey, 2009), as being 
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unrealistically optimistic about their learning ability allows children to explore 
strategies for learning and makes them less fearful of failure (Bjorklund, 1997). 
It also motivates persistence and protects children from learned helplessness 
(Bjorklund et al., 2009). Therefore, educational guidelines calling for all children 
to learn metacognitive strategies (Quigley et al., 2018) may be detrimental at 
some ages for some children’s cognitive development and learning.  
If metacognition is related to learned helplessness in children, it could 
also be related to their mental health, as it has been found that there is a link 
between learned helplessness, academic achievement and depression in 
children (Valås, 2001). This link between metacognition and mental health has 
been explored with adult participants, with results suggesting poor 
metacognition in adulthood is linked to poorer outcomes for individuals’ mental 
health (Janeck, Calamari, Riemann, & Heffelfinger, 2003; Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2003; Wells, 2005). Research suggests metacognition may play a part in 
a range of mental health disorders, such as depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2003), anxiety (Wells, 2005), schizophrenia (Lysaker et al., 2008) and 
obsessive compulsive disorder (Janeck et al., 2003). This may be due to an 
individual’s metacognitive beliefs leading to inflexible and maladaptive 
responses to thought patterns (Wells, 2000), or their beliefs leading to the 
thought patterns directly (for example, the utility of rumination; Smith & Alloy, 
2009).  
In typically developing children, aspects of metacognition have been 
explored, such as their emergent awareness ability of evaluation (Freeman, 
Karayanidis, & Chalmers, 2017) and prediction (Schneider, Visé, Lockl, & 
Nelson, 2000), as well as metacognitive knowledge (Sperling, Howard, Miller, & 
Murphy, 2002). Krasny-Pacini et al.’s (2015) model of emergent awareness also 
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includes error detection. The current literature around this ability in children is 
limited, and focuses more on clinical populations (Hüpen, Groen, Gaastra, 
Tucha, & Tucha, 2016; Liotti et al., 2005; Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015). Yet, from 
a clinical perspective it is important to understand the typical development of all 
aspects of emergent awareness to inform work with clinical populations. For the 
same reason it would also be important to understand how the different 
emergent awareness abilities relate to each other.  
The current study explored metacognition in children, using Krasny-
Pacini et al.’s (2015) model of emergent awareness. The aim was to explore 
typically developing children’s prediction, error detection, and evaluation 
abilities, how the relationships between them change by age, and how they 
relate to children’s awareness of these skills. If cognitive immaturity is beneficial 
for young children (Bjorklund, 2018) it would be expected that this age group 
would be less accurate on tasks of prediction, evaluation and error detection. 
For the same reason they may be more confident than older children in their 
learning ability, assessed in this study using a subjective measure of 
metacognitive knowledge.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The study addressed the following research questions: 
a) How do children’s emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error 
detection and evaluation differ between younger and older children? 
b) Is there a relationship between prediction, error detection and 
evaluation? Does this differ between younger and older children? 
c) How does children’s subjective metacognitive knowledge differ in 
younger and older children? How do children’s emergent awareness 
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abilities relate to their subjective metacognitive knowledge in these age 
groups? 
 
The hypotheses for the research questions were: 
1. Children’s prediction, error detection and evaluation abilities will all be 
more accurate in older children compared to younger children. 
2. There is a positive relationship between the emergent awareness 
abilities of prediction, error detection and evaluation.  
3. The relationships between children’s prediction, error detection, and 
evaluation abilities will be stronger in older children compared to younger 
children.  
4. Younger children will be more confident in their subjective metacognitive 
knowledge than the older age group.  
5. The relationship between children’s subjective metacognitive knowledge 
and emergent awareness (prediction, error detection and evaluation) will 
change between groups: younger children will more confident in their 
abilities but be less accurate on tasks of emergent awareness, whereas 
older children will have lower confidence in their knowledge but higher 
emergent awareness. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty-five children took part, recruited from Primary 
and Secondary Schools in England. There were 68 children in the younger 
group (36 females and 32 males; age M = 7.55, SD = 0.56) and 67 children in 
the older group (36 females and 31 males; age M = 11.14, SD = 0.35). Written, 
informed consent was gained from every participant, their parent/carer, their 
62 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
teacher and headteacher before they took part. The inclusion criteria was any 
school child with the relevant consent; there was no other exclusion criteria.     
 
Power Analyses 
Power analysis was conducted using G*Power. For the first research 
question independent t-tests were used to compare two groups (age) on a 
specific measure (either prediction, error detection, or evaluation). A medium 
effect size guideline is .5 (Cohen, 1988). Therefore, with an effect size of d = .5, 
two-tailed alpha of .05, and 80% power, 128 participants were required (64 per 
group). For the second and third research questions a sensitivity power analysis 
was performed to see what variance could be explained in a correlation (two 
independent Pearson’s r’s) of n = 128 with 80% power. This revealed an effect 
size of 0.45, which was considered acceptable.  
Design  
A quasi-experimental design was used, with a younger and older age 
group. To explore participants’ emergent awareness skills they completed 
measures of prediction, error detection and evaluation. They also completed a 
questionnaire as a measure of subjective metacognitive knowledge. The 
researcher was not blinded to the two groups.  
Materials 
The Junior Metacognitive Assessment Inventory. The Junior 
Metacognitive Assessment Inventory (Jr. MAI) is a self-report questionnaire 
used to assess participant’s confidence in their skills and strategies for learning 
(Sperling et al., 2002). This is part of individuals’ metacognitive knowledge 
(Flavell, 1979). As a self-report measure this would capture participants’ 
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subjective metacognitive knowledge. The Jr. MAI is based on the adult 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (Schraw & Dennison, 1994).  
There were two versions of the Jr. MAI questionnaire (see Appendix A) 
created for younger (ages 8-11 years old) and older (11-15 years old) children. 
Both were used in the study: version A with the younger age group and version 
B with the older age group. Both versions of the questionnaires instructed 
participants to read the sentences and circle the answer that most relates to 
how they do their schoolwork. Version A consists of 12 items and uses a three-
point Likert scale response (Never, Sometimes, Always), and version B includes 
six additional items and uses a five-point Likert scale (Never, Seldom, 
Sometimes, Often, Always). Although the Likert scales were different lengths, 
for this study the answers were weighted the same: Never weighted as 1; 
Sometimes as 3; and Always as 5.    
The first 12 items from each of the two versions of the Jr. MAI’s were 
considered in the analysis. This is because these were the same questions in 
both versions. A mean score for each participant was calculated from the 12 
items. A higher score indicated more confidence in their ability. This became 
their metacognitive knowledge score. 
The Dual-task Attention to Response Task. The Dual-task Attention to 
Response Task (DART; Dockree et al., 2006) is a computer-based go-no go 
test. It was extended into a test of error detection by O’Keeffe, Dockree, 
Moloney, Carton, and Robertson (2007). The DART has been used with 
children as a sustained attention and response inhibition task (Caspersen & 
Habekost, 2013), but has not included the additional error detection component. 
It was used in this study to measure prediction and error detection. 
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During the test the numbers 1-9 flashed up on the screen after a centrally 
placed fixation cross, for a duration of 150 ms each. The numbers were 
presented in 25 test rounds with a break in the middle. They were in a fixed 
series (1-9) for younger participants and in a random series for older 
participants, to ensure older participants made errors on the task. 
Participants were instructed to press the response key “n” following each 
white number (go trials), except when the number three was presented (no-go 
trials). In addition, some of the numbers were presented as grey digits in an 
unpredictable pattern. When these appeared participants had to press the 
response key “v”. Digits were presented on a dark grey background, the go 
numbers were white in colour, and the rare grey digits were presented in a light 
grey colour.    
As in previous studies, to make the DART an online emergent 
awareness test, participants were asked to indicate when they had made a 
mistake (Dockree, Tarleton, Carton, & FitzGerald, 2015) by saying ‘oops’. 
However, to make the task easier, participants were asked to indicate when 
they had made any mistake (and so this included errors of commission and 
omission), rather than just those of commission. They were given six practice 
rounds before the task began: three where they practised the response keys 
and three where they practised the response keys and saying ‘oops’. This 
stepped approach meant that the participants gradually learned what the task 
required. After the practice rounds participants were told how many rounds 
there were in the task and asked how many errors they believed they would 
make, as a measure of prediction. If the participant replied that they ‘didn’t 
know’ or were ‘unsure’, or did not give a specific answer such as ‘a few’ they 
were asked to give a specific number if they could, but were not pushed on this.     
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The computer recorded the number of errors each participant made. The 
total of these became a total error score. The number of times a participant 
identified an error (by saying ‘oops’) was recorded by the researcher. This 
became their total aware errors score. An overall error detection percentage 
score was calculated for each participant by dividing their total aware errors 
score (how many times the participants identified when they had made errors) 
by their total error score (how many errors the participants made during the 
DART; Dockree et al., 2015). A higher percentage indicated that participants 
were more aware of the errors they were making. 
The DART has not been previously used to measure prediction, but in a 
previous study looking at prediction, using judgments of learning, a percentage 
prediction score was calculated and compared to the actual error percentage 
score (Wojcik, Waterman, Lestié, Moulin, & Souchay, 2014). As the DART 
consisted of 25 rounds of nine numbers, there were a total of 225 trials. The 
prediction percentage score was calculated by dividing participants’ prediction 
scores by the number of trials (225). An actual error percentage score was 
calculated by dividing participants’ total error scores by the number of trials. The 
difference between the two scores was calculated by taking away the actual 
error percentage score from the prediction percentage score. A smaller 
difference score indicated better prediction ability.  
Judgment of Confidence task. This measured participants’ evaluative 
ability. It was based on the Judgment of Confidence (JOC) task used by 
Grainger et al. (2016). It involved participants watching a short educational 
video on the computer about Eastern Gray kangaroos 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-nQzs_4WhO0). Once the video had 
finished the participants were given 16 questions about kangaroos (see 
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Appendix B), answers to which had been presented in the video. As per 
Grainger et al. (2016), the questions included four easy and four very difficult 
items. Participants were asked to provide answers to all the questions, and 
were told if they were unsure they should guess. However, a lot of participants 
left questions unanswered, and in these cases the researcher asked for a 
reason why the questions had been left. 
On the other side of the page to the questions were the JOC scales, 
folded over while the participants answered the 16 questions so they were not 
visible. Afterwards, this part of each page was folded back, and participants 
were asked to rate how confident they were in each of their 16 answers on a 7-
point Likert rating scale (from extremely unsure to extremely sure). The rating 
scale was fully explained to participants and it was checked that they 
understood what they were required to do before they began. Participants’ 
accuracy and confidence scores were recorded for each question. 
The average confidence judgment scores for both the correct answers 
and the incorrect answers were calculated. The difference between these two 
scores was then calculated, labelled participants’ JOC difference score, with a 
larger difference between these two scores indicating better evaluative 
accuracy. 
Procedure  
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Exeter Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix C for the letter of approval). Schools 
were approached through convenience sampling. A flowchart showing the 
recruitment process can be seen in Figure 1. Information sheets outlining the 
research and what was involved in taking part (see Appendix D), were emailed 
to schools. If the headteacher emailed back expressing interest then an 
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individual meeting was set up between the headteacher and the researcher, to 
discuss the project further and answer any questions. The researcher also 
offered to attend teacher, governor, and/or parent meetings to explain the 
research. This only happened in one school. Written consent was gained from 
the headteachers and the teachers of the classes identified as those who were 
eligible to take part (see Appendix E).  
 
Figure 1: Flowchart showing recruitment of participants. 
 
Parents/carers of children in the identified classes were sent information 
leaflets and consent forms (see Appendix F). These were sent out at least two 
weeks before the research began in the school. The consent forms were opt-in 
and parents/carers were asked to sign them and return them to school if they 
 
 
 
Schools approached to take part in the research 
(Primary schools = 12, Secondary schools = 4) 
Schools who signed up to take part in the 
research (Primary schools = 2, Secondary 
schools = 1) 
School classes who signed up to take part in the 
research (Primary schools = 6, Secondary 
school = 8) 
Leaflets and consent forms out to parents/carers 
(Primary schools = 196, Secondary schools = 
187) 
Parents/carers who consented their child into 
the research (Primary schools = 93, Secondary 
schools = 113) 
Children who were approached to take part in 
the research (Primary schools = 69, Secondary 
schools = 71) 
Children who took part in the research (Primary 
schools = 68, Secondary schools = 67) 
Children who did not 
consent (Primary school = 
1, Secondary school = 4) 
Remaining not completed 
due to lack of time 
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gave consent for their child to take part. Children did not take part without 
written parent/carer consent.  
The research was carried out in school time, on a table in a room or in a 
corridor allocated to the researcher. All children were tested individually. Before 
testing the researcher went into each class, introduced herself, and explained 
what the study was about. She made it clear that the children did not have to 
take part if they did not want to. The teacher was shown the parent/carer 
consent forms (of children who had parent/carer consent), identified the 
children, and asked the children if they would like to take part. If they agreed 
they were taken out of class by the researcher. The study took approximately 
30 minutes per child.  
The procedure was firstly piloted with a small sample of children (N = 6; 
these children had the necessary consent to take part). It took approximately 30 
minutes for each participant to complete the study.  The participant was read an 
information sheet (see Appendix G) by the researcher and asked if they had 
any questions. They were reminded that they did not have to take part and 
could withdraw from the study at any point without any repercussions. If they 
agreed to take part then the researcher went through the consent form (see 
Appendix G) and asked the participant to sign it. The researcher recorded the 
participant’s age and gender. 
Participants completed the Jr MAI, the DART and the JOC measures. 
The measures were carried out in the same order for every participant. 
Participants were made aware that they could choose not to take part in any of 
these measures. Once the three measures had been completed a debrief sheet 
was given to each participant (see Appendix G). This explained the procedure 
for removing their data at a later time should they wish (up to three months 
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afterwards). Participants were thanked for taking part in the study and taken 
back to their class.    
Proposed Data Analysis Strategy   
How do children’s emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error 
detection and evaluation differ between younger and older children? 
Error detection. The means and standard deviations were calculated for 
the total error scores, total aware errors scores and overall error detection 
percentage scores by age. An independent measures t-test was carried out on 
the error detection percentage scores to determine if there was a significant 
difference between the younger and older participants’ error detection scores.  
Prediction. The means and standard deviations were calculated for the 
percentage prediction score, actual error score, and the difference between 
these scores (difference prediction percentage scores) by age. An independent 
measures t-test was performed on the difference prediction percentage scores 
to determine if there was a significant difference between the younger and older 
participants’ scores. 
Evaluation. The analysis was based on that used by Grainger et al. 
(2016) to determine metacognitive monitoring accuracy. The means and 
standard deviations of participants’ average confidence judgment scores for 
their correct answers and their incorrect answers, as well as the difference 
between these two scores were calculated by the two age groups. A larger 
difference between these two scores indicated more accurate evaluation. An 
independent measures t-test was carried out on the difference scores to 
determine if there was a significant difference between the younger and older 
participants’ evaluation scores. 
70 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
Second, Goodman and Kruskal's (1979) gamma scores were calculated 
for each participant’s JOC scores, which take chance into consideration. To 
calculate gamma scores the formula G = (P-Q)/(P+Q), where P is the number of 
cases ranked in the same order on both variables and Q is the number of cases 
ranked in reverse order. However, as gamma scores cannot be calculated when 
two or more cases are 0, raw data was adjusted using Snodgrass and Corwin’s 
(1988) correction. This adds 0.5 to each frequency and divides the number by 
the overall number of confidence judgments made (N) plus one (N + 1). The 
calculated gamma correlations range from 1 to -1: a score of 0 indicates 
chance-level accuracy; a large positive value indicates participants’ answers 
and confidence ratings are similar; and negative scores indicate an inverse 
relationship. Therefore, a larger gamma score indicates higher evaluative 
ability.  
Is there a relationship between prediction, error detection and 
evaluation? Does this differ between younger and older children? First, the 
JOC gamma correlations were transformed using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation, 
to ensure the sampling distribution was roughly normal and its variance more 
equal across the range of correlations. Correlations between the prediction 
percentage scores (prediction), error detection percentage scores (error 
detection) and JOC gamma (evaluation) scores by age were calculated. These 
revealed if there were relationships between these variables within the two 
different age groups.  
The two corresponding correlation coefficients were then compared 
across age groups to assess the significance of the difference between them. 
This was completed using the Fisher r-to-z transformation.  
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How does children’s subjective metacognitive knowledge differ in 
younger and older children? How do children’s emergent awareness 
abilities relate to their subjective metacognitive knowledge in these age 
groups? First, the means and standard deviations were calculated for the 
subjective metacognitive knowledge scores. An independent measures t-test 
was carried out on these scores to determine if there was a significant 
difference between the younger and older participants’ metacognitive 
knowledge. 
Then correlations between the subjective metacognitive knowledge, 
prediction, error detection and evaluation scores were calculated for the 
younger and older age groups. These revealed if there were relationships 
between subjective metacognitive knowledge and emergent awareness abilities 
within the two different age groups. As previously, each of the corresponding 
correlation coefficients was assessed for significant difference between each 
age group using the Fisher r-to-z transformation.  
Results 
The sample size was large enough that under the central limit theorem 
normality assumptions were met. Outliers (defined as any value whose distance 
from the nearest quartile is greater than 1.5 times the interquartile range) were 
included in the data analysis. The analysis was also run with outliers removed, 
and where significant differences in the results were found, these were 
reported.  
How do children’s emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error 
detection and evaluation differ between younger and older children? 
Error detection. One participant in the younger age group did not take 
part in the DART, as after viewing the instructions declined to take part. The 
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means and standard deviations of the total error scores, total aware errors 
scores, and percentage error detection scores were calculated. These can be 
seen in Table 1.  Participants in the younger age group made significantly more 
errors overall than participants in the older age group, t(132) = 3.48, p < .005, d 
= 0.60. They were also significantly less aware of making these errors, 
t(119.73) = -5.97, p < .001, d = 1.03. To determine if there was a difference 
between the percentage of errors made by younger and older children, an 
independent t-test was performed on the error detection percentage scores. 
This revealed that older participants were significantly more aware of the errors 
they were making when compared to younger participants, t(123.10) = -7.71, p 
< .001, d = 1.33. This supports the hypothesis that children’s error detection 
becomes more accurate as they get older. 
Prediction. When asked the prediction question of the DART, twelve 
younger participants and three participants from the older age group gave 
vague answers or stated they were ‘unsure’ and so their data were not used in 
the analysis. The means and standard deviations of the prediction errors 
percentage scores, the actual errors percentage scores and the difference 
prediction percentage scores were calculated (see Table 1). It appears that 
younger children were less accurate at predicting how many errors they would 
make on the DART task, underestimating the number of errors they made more 
than the older age group. An independent measures t-test performed on the 
difference prediction percentage scores revealed significant differences 
between the younger and older participants’ scores, t(117) = 4.86, p < .001, d = 
0.88. Older participants were significantly more accurate at predicting how 
many errors they would make compared to younger participants. This supports 
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the hypothesis that children’s prediction ability becomes more accurate as they 
get older. 
  Evaluation. For the judgment of confidence task one participant from 
each age group did not want to participate. The missing data for each question 
can be seen in Appendix H, which were not missing at random but questions 
participants missed out due to finding them too difficult. These did not directly 
affect the results as the averages were calculated according to how many 
questions the participants had answered.  
The means and standard deviations for the average confidence judgment 
scores for the correct answers, incorrect answers, and the difference between 
these scores were calculated (see Table 1). An independent measures t-test 
was carried out on the JOC difference scores to determine if there was a 
significant difference between the younger and older participants’ evaluation 
scores. This revealed a significant difference t(124.31) = -2.48, p < .05, d = 
0.43. By looking at the means it appears older participants were more accurate 
at evaluating their scores.    
The means and standard deviations for the JOC gamma scores by age 
were calculated and can be seen in Table 1. An independent t-test revealed 
significant differences for these two scores, t(101.6) = 3.70, p < .001, d = 0.64. 
By considering the means it appears that when chance is taken into 
consideration, younger participants’ evaluative ability is more accurate than 
older children’s. A negative gamma indicates high confidence in incorrect 
answers and low confidence in correct answers, and the older participants’ 
gamma mean score was more negative than the younger group’s mean score. 
This does not support the hypothesis that older children’s evaluative ability is 
more accurate than younger children’s ability.  
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Table 1. 
Means and standard deviations of the error detection, prediction, and evaluation 
scores by age group. 
  Error Detection 
Groups N Total errors Total aware errors Error detection % 
M SD M SD M SD 
Younger 67 29.00 16.79 4.16 4.07 18.49 20.78 
Older 67 20.12 12.49 9.25 5.67 50.86 27.38 
  Prediction 
  Prediction errors % Actual errors % Difference prediction % 
  M SD M SD M SD 
Younger 55 3.25 6.57 12.22 7.19 -8.97 10.47 
Older 64 8.39 8.39 9.13 5.58 -0.74 7.99 
  Evaluation 
  JOC correct  JOC incorrect  JOC difference JOC gamma 
  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Younger 67 6.08 0.60 3.87 1.22 2.21 1.15 -0.52 0.20 
Older 66 6.00 0.48 3.35 1.06 2.65 0.90 -0.62 0.11 
 
Is there a relationship between prediction, error detection and evaluation? 
Does this differ between younger and older children? 
Correlations between the prediction, error detection and evaluation 
scores by age were calculated and can be seen in Table 2. These revealed no 
significant correlations between any of the variables at either age, which does 
not support hypothesis 2 that there is a positive relationship between the three 
emergent awareness abilities. 
The analysis was re-run with eight outliers removed. This revealed three 
correlations that became significant (a table of the correlations can be seen in 
Appendix I). It was found that for younger children, there was a significant 
correlation between their error detection and evaluation scores, r(61) = -.27, p < 
.05, suggesting those that performed better at one performed worse on the 
other measure. There were also significant correlations between older children’s 
prediction and error detection scores, r(61) = .26, p < .05, and prediction and 
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evaluation scores, r(60) = .26, p < .05. As prediction scores are more accurate 
the lower they are and error detection/evaluation scores are more accurate the 
higher they are, these correlations suggests older children who are better at 
prediction are worse at the other emergent awareness abilities. These findings 
appear to contradict hypothesis 2, as they suggest negative relationships 
between some emergent awareness abilities.  
The r-to-z Fisher transformations revealed no significant difference 
between age groups for the prediction and error detection correlation 
coefficients, z = -.65, p = .516, or the error detection and evaluation correlation 
coefficients, z = -1.57, p = .116. However, there was a significant difference 
between the prediction and evaluation correlation coefficients, z = -2.19, p < 
.05. By looking at the correlations it appears that the relationship changes from 
a negative to positive one as children get older. As prediction scores are more 
accurate the lower they are and evaluation scores are more accurate the higher 
they are, it appears the relationship between the two abilities becomes weaker 
as children get older. This does not support hypothesis three that the 
relationship between the three emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error 
detection and evaluation will become stronger as children get older.  
Re-running the analysis with eight identified outliers removed (see table 
A2, Appendix I) revealed the significant difference between the prediction and 
evaluation correlation coefficients remained, z = -2.08, p < .05. There was also 
a significant difference between the error detection and evaluation correlation 
coefficients, z = -2.07, p < .05.  In younger participants those who performed 
better at one measure performed worse at the other, yet in older participants 
this changes to a non-significant positive relationship. This suggests that 
between the younger and older age group the relationship between error 
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detection and evaluation becomes stronger. Although this one correlation 
appears to partially support hypothesis 3, overall the lack of other significant 
relationships and a significant inverse one being found suggests that the 
relationship between the three emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error 
detection and evaluation do not become stronger as children get older. 
 
Table 2 
Correlations among prediction, error detection, evaluation, and metacognitive 
knowledge by age. 
Younger participants 
 Prediction Error detection Evaluation 
Emergent Awareness    
     Prediction    
     Error Detection .12   
     Evaluation -.19 -.21  
Subjective metacognitive 
knowledge 
-.24 -.19 -.09 
Older participants 
 Prediction Error detection Evaluation 
Emergent Awareness    
     Prediction    
     Error Detection .24   
     Evaluation .22 .07  
Subjective metacognitive 
knowledge 
.12 -.05 -.20 
Difference between correlations coefficients for older vs. younger (z) 
 Prediction Error detection Evaluation 
Emergent Awareness    
     Prediction    
     Error Detection -0.65   
     Evaluation -2.19* -1.57  
Subjective metacognitive 
knowledge 
-1.90 -0.76 0.59 
*p < .05.    
 
How does children’s subjective metacognitive knowledge differ in 
younger and older children? How do children’s emergent awareness 
abilities relate to their subjective metacognitive knowledge in these age 
groups?  
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One participant in the older age group did not fill out the metacognitive 
questionnaire. The means and standard deviations of the metacognitive 
knowledge scores were calculated and can be seen in Table 3. An independent 
measures t-test revealed significant differences between the younger and older 
participants’ metacognitive knowledge, t(132) = 4.65, p < .001, d = 0.80. 
Younger participants rated their metacognitive knowledge significantly higher 
than the older age group. This supports hypothesis four that younger children 
will be more confident in their subjective metacognitive knowledge than the 
older age group. 
 
Table 3. 
Means and standard deviations of the subjective metacognitive knowledge 
scores by age group. 
  Subjective metacognitive 
knowledge Group N 
  M SD 
Younger 68 3.98 0.50 
Older 66 3.57 0.50 
 
Correlations between subjective metacognitive knowledge, prediction, 
error detection and evaluation scores were calculated for each of the two age 
groups. These can be seen in Table 2. These revealed no significant 
relationships between the emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error 
detection and evaluation, and metacognitive knowledge at either age. When the 
analysis was re-run with nine identified outliers removed this revealed a 
significant correlation in older participants between their metacognitive skill of 
evaluation and metacognitive knowledge r(61) = -.26, p < .05. Older participants 
who performed better on the evaluation measure were worse on the measure of 
subjective metacognitive knowledge. 
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The r-to-z Fisher transformations were calculated. The between-group 
correlation coefficients can be seen in Table 2 and reveal no significant 
differences between the correlations by age group. These correlations did not 
change when outliers were removed (see Appendix I).  
Overall the correlations do not support hypothesis five of the study that 
the relationships between subjective metacognitive knowledge and emergent 
awareness skills will change as children get older. Although one correlation 
(when identified outliers were removed) in older children appeared to show 
those with lower confidence may perform better on emergent awareness tasks 
of evaluation, this was within the age group, rather than in comparison to the 
younger age group. 
Discussion 
The aim of the study was to explore how children’s metacognition differ 
in younger and older children, in particular looking at their emergent awareness 
abilities of prediction, error detection and evaluation. Emergent awareness was 
divided into these components in a model put forward by Krasny-Pacini et al. 
(2015), who defined these skills as those used by individuals when carrying out 
tasks to monitor and regulate their actions (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015). The first 
hypothesis, that children’s emergent awareness abilities of prediction, error 
detection and evaluation become more accurate as they get older, is only 
partially supported by the findings. Children in the older age group were more 
accurate at predicting how many mistakes they would make on a task and were 
more aware when they were making errors as the task was being carried out 
than younger children. However, older children appeared to be worse (when 
chance was taken into consideration) at evaluating the answers they had given 
on a task, compared to the younger age group. This final finding is not 
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consistent with previous research that states metacognition develops 
throughout childhood (Kuhn, 2000), including children’s ability to evaluate their 
answers more accurately (Roebers, Schmid, & Roderer, 2009).  
One explanation for the finding that evaluative emergent awareness is 
worse in older children is that it could be due to different aspects of 
metacognition coming online at different times during a child’s development, as 
suggested by Krasny-Pacini et al. (2015). Krasny-Pacini et al. (2015) believed 
this could be because different components of metacognition are important at 
different stages of children’s development. Therefore, it may be that for younger 
children the component of their cognition that is online and developing is their 
evaluative emergent awareness. On the other hand, in the older age group it 
may be less so, due to other cognitions being more online at this age and so 
using more cognitive resources than this ability. 
The results of the study also provided no evidence for hypothesis 2, that 
there will be a positive relationship between prediction, error detection and 
evaluation at either age. It is unknown why these were not related, but it may be 
that they are more strongly related to other aspects of cognitive functioning. 
Another explanation for these null findings comes from looking at the literature 
around the development of other cognitions during childhood, such as executive 
functions. As stated previously, metacognition is closely linked to executive 
functions (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000) and may follow a similar 
developmental pattern (Roebers, 2017). It has been found that for executive 
functions, although the different functions are interrelated, they develop 
separately from one another (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001). This 
ties in to the differentiation-dedifferentiation hypothesis: the theory that 
cognitions (such as executive functions) break down into distinct constructs in 
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childhood as they develop (Garrett, 1946) before becoming unified in adulthood 
(Brydges, Reid, Fox, & Anderson, 2012). This could also explain why when the 
analysis was re-run with outliers removed, it was found that younger children 
who performed better at error detection did worse on their evaluation, and for 
older children those that were better at prediction were worse at error detection 
and evaluation. 
The theory of differentiation-dedifferentiation (Garrett, 1946) may also 
explain the lack of findings in support of hypothesis 3: relationships between 
children’s prediction, error detection, and evaluation abilities will become 
stronger as a child gets older. A significant difference was found between the 
children’s prediction and evaluation abilities, but it appeared these two abilities 
became more dissociated as children got older. This could be due to these 
cognitions breaking down into distinct constructs in childhood as they develop 
(Garrett, 1946). The oldest participants in the study were 12 years old and their 
metacognitive abilities would still be developing at this age (Weil et al., 2013). 
However, it is interesting to note that (when outliers were removed) it 
appeared that error detection and evaluation scores became more associated. 
So although some components of metacognition may become dissociated as 
children get older (Garrett, 1946), others may become more associated. Again 
this could be evidence for different components of metacognition coming online 
at different times during a child’s development (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015).  
The study also explored subjective metacognitive knowledge in younger 
and older children. The results appeared to show children’s confidence in their 
metacognitive knowledge got significantly lower as they got older. This supports 
hypothesis four of the study that children’s subjective metacognitive knowledge 
will be higher in the younger age group. Previous research has put forward the 
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theory that cognitive immaturity can be adaptive for children at particular ages 
(Bjorklund, 2018). Younger children may benefit from being unrealistically 
optimistic about their learning ability as it allows them to explore strategies for 
learning and makes them less fearful of failure (Bjorklund, 1997). This means 
they are more motivated to persist at tasks, which could result in better learning 
in the long-term (Bjorklund et al., 2009). The results of this study reflect 
Bjorklund’s (1997) theory, as younger children performed worse than older 
children on two tasks of emergent awareness, but yet were more confident in 
their subjective metacognitive knowledge. This suggests that younger children 
are more cognitively immature, as they self-reported that they had confidence in 
the strategies and skills they needed for learning, but their scores on the other 
measures did not reflect this.  
Yet when looking for significant differences between the relationships 
between the skills and subjective metacognitive knowledge across the two age 
groups, no significant differences were found. It was hypothesised that younger 
children would be more confident in their abilities but have lower emergent 
awareness skills, whereas older children would have lower confidence in their 
knowledge but higher skills (hypothesis 5). This would have provided further 
support for the theory of cognitive immaturity (Bjorklund, 1997). However, the 
pattern of results did not reflect this. The results suggested that in older 
children, those with lower confidence in their metacognitive knowledge may 
perform better on emergent awareness tasks of evaluation. As metacognition 
develops throughout childhood and adolescent (Weil et al., 2013), it could be 
argued this shows cognitive immaturity as children in the older age group were 
still relatively young. However, this result needs to be interpreted with caution 
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due to it only being one emergent awareness ability and the relationship was 
only significant when the analysis was run without outliers.  
The findings provide a mixed picture of children’s metacognition. 
Although children’s predictive and error detecting emergent awareness become 
more accurate as children get older, this study did not find the same for 
children’s evaluative emergent awareness. This suggests that the abilities are 
distinct from each other, and may also not be related to children’s subjective 
metacognitive knowledge. Overall the findings highlight the complexity of the 
development of children’s metacognition. 
Clinical Implications 
One implication of the results is the possible need for children’s 
metacognition to be taken into consideration during clinical assessments. The 
findings of this study suggest that younger children have poorer emergent 
awareness than older children, but that they also hold beliefs that their 
metacognition is better at this age. It would suggest that simply asking younger 
children about their metacognition would not result in accurate representation of 
their emergent awareness ability. Therefore, it may be beneficial to develop 
appropriate clinical measures that objectively measure these abilities, to gain an 
accurate understanding of children’s metacognitive ability.  
It would be important to do this to inform clinical formulations and 
intervention work, as it has been found (although the research was completed 
with adult participants) that metacognition may influence the development and 
maintenance of mental health difficulties (Janeck et al., 2003; Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2003; Wells, 2005). It would also have an impact on the ability children 
have to think around tasks that they are asked to complete as part of the 
intervention. For example, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) has been found 
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to be beneficial for children as young as eight years old (Kendall, Safford, 
Flannery-Schroeder, & Webb, 2004) and possibly younger (Minde, Roy, 
Bezonsky, & Hashemi, 2010). Yet this research highlights that at age seven, 
children struggle to predict their performance on tasks, which is often asked of 
participants completing CBT, for example, when completing behavioural 
experiments. Therefore, if measures of metacognition were part of the 
assessment, then interventions may be more successful if tailored to fit with 
children’s metacognitive abilities.  
Additionally the findings of the study may be particularly relevant for 
children who may have diminished metacognition, or do not develop 
metacognition as expected, due to neurodevelopmental or health conditions 
(Grainger et al., 2016; Shen et al., 2011; Kizonyet et al., 2014). The findings of 
the study show that the different constructs of emergent awareness can be 
measured and that they are differentiated in childhood. As a result it would be 
important to consider all of the different abilities during assessments with 
participants with known metacognitive deficits and then tailor interventions to 
suit their strengths and weaknesses.  
Strengths and Limitations 
A strength of the study was that this appears to be the first time that 
three different emergent awareness abilities and metacognitive knowledge have 
been looked at in the same sample of participants, across two different age 
groups. In previous research specific abilities have been explored (Freeman et 
al., 2017; Schneider et al., 2000), rather than more than one aspect of 
metacognition. By looking at three emergent awareness abilities and 
metacognitive knowledge it has allowed this study to look at the relationships 
between these constructs within and between the two groups of participants.  
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Another strength of the study was the method used to measure error 
detection. Previous studies with children have measured this using brain 
electrical activity (Liotti et al., 2005), which calls into question whether 
participants are consciously aware when they are making a mistake, or with 
behavioural tasks that take a long time and so are not always feasible with 
larger groups of participants (Krasny-Pacini et al., 2015). The DART can 
measure online error detection as it asks participants to verbally indicate their 
awareness of making an error (O’Keeffe et al., 2007) and takes around 10 
minutes to complete. It was easy to administer and children engaged well with 
it.    
On the other hand there were limitations to the research, one of which 
was the other measures used. The Jr. MAI could be seen as a poor measure of 
metacognitive knowledge, as it was the children’s subjective opinion of their 
learning skills. It was assumed that those who scored higher on their measure 
were more confident, but it may have been that their learning strategies and 
skills were more accurate than those who scored lower, rather than only their 
confidence in them. Future research may need to consider an objective 
measure of metacognitive knowledge, such as a teacher-report questionnaire. 
As well as this, on the measure of prediction twelve younger participants and 
three participants from the older age group gave vague answers or stated they 
were ‘unsure’. Their data could not used in the analysis for this reason. This is 
quite a big proportion of sample used, particularly the younger age group, 
suggesting that even the task of predicting may be too hard for some children.  
Other limitations of the study were methodological issues. The schools 
were recruited through convenience sampling, meaning that it could have been 
particular ones that signed up to the study, for example, those with an interest in 
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metacognition. Also, they were all from a similar area of the country, which was 
considered rural, so the results may have been different if participants had been 
from other schools, for example, inner city schools. Another methodological 
limitation was that the researcher could not be blind to conditions and so may 
have unintentionally influenced participants. As well as this, the research looked 
at discrete age groups rather than across a continuum. This meant that it was 
more difficult to make conclusions about the trajectory changes of 
metacognition across age groups.  
Future Research 
Future research could use a longitudinal design and consider 
metacognition across age, rather than comparing younger and older groups of 
children. For example, it could carry out the same measures of metacognition 
with children between the ages of nine to ten and twelve to fourteen. This would 
enable a clearer picture to be gained about how metacognition develops and 
changes across childhood.   
Conclusion 
This study has built on previous research by providing evidence that some of 
children’s metacognitive emergent awareness (prediction and error detection) 
become more accurate as children get older. However, the results did not 
reflect this with evaluative emergent awareness. It appears that these abilities 
are distinct from each other, and are not related to children’s subjective 
metacognitive knowledge of their learning skills and strategies. They also may 
become more differentiated as children get older, tying in with the 
differentiation-dedifferentiation theory. These findings suggest care needs to be 
taken to consider children’s metacognitive development in clinical and 
educational settings to ensure interventions are suited to their abilities.  
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Appendix A 
The Metacognitive Assessment Inventories (Version A & B) 
The Metacognitive Assessment Inventory: Version A 
We are interested in what learners do when they study. Please read the 
following sentences and circle the answer that relates to you and the way you 
are when you are doing school work or home work. Please answer as honestly 
as possible. 
 
 
1. I know when I understand something.  Never Sometimes Always 
 
2. I can make myself learn when I need to.  Never Sometimes Always 
 
3. I try to use ways of studying that have worked for 
me before. 
 
Never Sometimes Always 
 
4. I know what the teacher expects me to learn.  
 
Never Sometimes Always 
 
5. I learn best when I already know something 
about the topic. 
 
Never Sometimes Always 
 
6. I draw pictures or diagrams to help me 
understand while learning. 
 
Never Sometimes Always 
7. When I am done with my schoolwork, I ask 
myself if I learned what I wanted to learn. 
 
Never Sometimes Always 
8. I think of several ways to solve a problem and 
then choose the best one. 
 
Never Sometimes Always 
9. I think about what I need to learn before I start 
working 
 
Never Sometimes Always 
 
10. I ask myself how well I am doing while I am 
learning something new. 
 
Never Sometimes Always 
11. I really pay attention to important information. 
 
Never Sometimes Always 
 
12. I learn more when I am interested in the topic.  Never Sometimes Always 
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The Metacognitive Assessment Inventory: Version B 
We are interested in what learners do when they study. Please read the 
following sentences and circle the answer that relates to you and the way you 
are when you are doing school work or home work. Please answer as honestly 
as possible. 
 
1 = Never        2 = Seldom        3 = Sometimes        4 = Often        5 = Always 
 
1. I know when I understand something.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I can make myself learn when I need to.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. I try to use ways of studying that have worked for 
me before. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
4. I know what the teacher expects me to learn.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I learn best when I already know something about 
the topic. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. I draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand 
while learning. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. When I am done with my schoolwork, I ask myself 
if I learned what I wanted to learn. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. I think of several ways to solve a problem and then 
choose the best one. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. I think about what I need to learn before I start 
working 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. I ask myself how well I am doing while I am 
learning something new. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. I really pay attention to important information. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. I learn more when I am interested in the topic.  1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. I use my learning strengths to make up for my 
weaknesses.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
14. I use different learning strategies depending on 
the task 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. I occasionally check to make sure I’ll get my work 
done on time. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
16. I sometimes use learning strategies without 
thinking. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. I ask myself if there was an easier way to do 
things after I finish a task. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
18. I decide what I need to get done before I start a 
task. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Appendix B 
Judgment of Confidence Task 
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Please write down an answer under 
each question… 
 Now please circle an answer to the 
following… 
1. How many eyes does a 
kangaroo have? 
 
 
 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                          Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2. What country are Eastern Gray 
kangaroos from? 
 
 
 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3. Where do female kangaroos 
keep their babies? 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4. What part of their bodies do 
kangaroos use to move around? 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5. How do male kangaroos get 
attention from female kangaroos? 
 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6. How many babies can a female 
kangaroo look after at one time? 
 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
7. What is a group of kangaroos 
called? 
 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
8. What is a baby kangaroo called? 
 
 
 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
9. What do kangaroos use their 
tails for? 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
10. Why is a kangaroo a marsupial 
animal? 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
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11. What do kangaroos eat?  On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
12. What are baby kangaroos the 
size of when they are born? 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
13. How far can a kangaroo jump (in 
feet)? 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
14. What is the Latin species name 
for the Eastern Gray Kangaroo? 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
15. What does their Latin species 
name mean? 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                           Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
16. What family do kangaroos 
belong to? 
 
 On a scale of 1-7, how confident are 
you that your answer is correct? 
Extremely                          Extremely  
  unsure                                      sure 
     1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
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Your project has been reviewed by the CLES – Psychology Ethics Committee and 
has received a Favourable opinion.  
The Committee has made the following 
comments about your application:  
- Please view your application at https://eethics.exeter.ac.uk/CLESPsy/ to see 
comments in full. If you have received a Favourable with conditions, Provisional or 
unfavourable outcome you are required to re-submit for full review and/or confirm 
that committee comments have been addressed before you begin your research.  
If you have any further queries, please 
contact your Ethics Officer.  
Yours sincerely 
 
Date: 28/04/2019  
CLES – Psychology Ethics Committee  
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Appendix D 
Information Leaflet for Schools 
 
 
Children’s Metacognition:  
Are older children more aware of making mistakes when carrying out a task 
compared to younger children? Do they also have more awareness about how 
they learn best?  
 
Thank you for considering our request to conduct research into children’s 
metacognition with children in your school.  
We’re very happy to answer any questions you have about the project and have 
provided our contact details on the next page. 
 
Introduction 
My name is Becky Jenkin and I am a student based at the University of Exeter. I am 
currently completing my training to become a Clinical Psychologist. As part of this I am 
carrying out a research project, about children’s metacognition: how they think about 
their thinking. I am looking at whether children become more aware at noticing when 
they make mistakes on a task as they get older. It is being carried out with children 
between the ages of 7 – 14 years old. The project has been reviewed by the University 
of Exeter Psychology Ethics Committee. 
 
Why has my school been approached? 
We are approaching schools in XXXX to see if they would be interested in taking part in 
the study. We are doing this by emailing schools.  
   
What will happen during the study? 
Children will be taken out of class one at a time, and asked to complete some activities 
with Becky. This will take approximately 45 minutes per child. All children will be asked 
to complete activities looking at their abilities to predict and evaluate what they are 
carrying out. There will also be an activity that looks at their ability to detect errors. The 
answers children give during these activities will be recorded by Becky. Overall this 
data should teach us more about how children think about their own thinking style.  
 
The tasks the children complete are set up as puzzles and games, which are suitable 
for their age. They are not being tested on their overall intelligence – we are only 
comparing the results of the measures by age. 
 
Every child can decide not to take part, or choose to stop the study at any point. 
This will be told to them at the start of the study.   
 
Consent that is required 
For the research to go ahead we require consent from the headteacher and teachers 
(of the classes taking part) in the school. 
 
Also parents/legal guardians of all the children in the class will be approached for 
permission for their child to take part in the study. With your permission, a leaflet about 
the study will be sent via the school to the parents with an opt-in form, which they can 
fill in and return to the school office should they consent to their child taking part.  
 
Can the school, individual children or teachers change our minds and withdraw 
from the study at any time? 
Yes. The school, children and teachers are free to withdraw from the study at any 
point, without giving a reason, and without your legal rights being affected. 
Information Leaflet for Schools 
(Version 2: June 2018) 
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What are the benefits of taking part? 
This research fits within the science curriculum (working scientifically), teaching 
children about scientific attitudes and experimental skills and investigations. 
 
What if I do not want my school/class to take part? 
You do not need to take part in the study, it is completely your decision whether to take 
part or not.  
 
Confidentiality and security of Information 
All information that we collect about each child will be kept confidential, unless doing so 
would put anyone at risk of serious harm. Information gathered will be anonymised. In 
accordance with the research ethical guidance of the University of Exeter Psychology 
Ethics Committee the information collected in the study will be used for research 
purposes only and stored securely, in a locked filing cabinet or on a password 
protected laptop. All data will be destroyed 5 years after publication.  
 
The data collected during the study may be looked at by members of the research 
team at the University of Exeter. We will aim to publish the findings from this study so 
other people working in this area can learn about our work. All schools and children will 
remain completely anonymous in any write-up, and will not be identified in any 
publication. Anonymised data may also be shared with other researchers in the future.  
 
The University of Exeter processes personal data for the purposes of carrying out 
research in the public interest. The University will endeavour to be transparent about its 
processing of your personal data and this information sheet should provide a clear 
explanation of this. If you do have any queries about the University’s processing of your 
personal data that cannot be resolved by the research team, further information may be 
obtained from the University’s Data Protection Officer by emailing 
dataprotection@exeter.ac.uk or at www.exeter.ac.uk/dataprotection 
 
Time Commitment 
Time commitment will differ depending on what is most suitable for each school. We’re 
very happy to discuss the best requirements for your school. 
 
Any questions? 
If you have any questions about this study, either now or in the future, please contact: 
  
Becky Jenkin 
DClinPsy student         rebecca.jenkin@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Jenny Limond 
Senior lecturer at the University of Exeter     
(Supervisor on this project)     J.Limond@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about the way in which this study has been carried out 
please contact the Chair of the University of Exeter Psychology Ethics Committee:- 
 
Lisa Leaver 
Chair, UoE Psychology Ethics Committee  l.a.leaver@ex.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for considering this request. 
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Appendix E 
Headteacher and Teacher Consent Forms 
 
Children’s Metacognition:  
Are older children more aware of making mistakes when carrying out a task 
compared to younger children? Do they also have more awareness about how 
they learn best?   
Name of researcher: Becky Jenkin 
I have read the information leaflet (version 2: June 2018) for the above study. I have 
had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions, and have had these 
answered satisfactorily. I understand that I am free to request any further information at 
any stage.  
I know that: (please circle Yes / No)   
1. this school’s participation is entirely voluntary;  Yes / No 
2. the school is free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason 
and without mine or the school’s legal rights being affected; 
 Yes / No 
3. I agree to let the researcher come into the school and collect data from 
the children, subject to her obtaining consent from the teachers of 
those classes that will be affected; 
 Yes / No 
 
4. I understand that the research will be taking place in a room 
designated to the researcher by the school, and will involve each child 
being taken out of class for approximately 45 minutes; 
 Yes / No 
5. I understand that any teacher, parent/carer or child can decide not to 
take part or withdraw from the study and that this will result in no 
negative consequences.   
 
 Yes / No 
6. the data that is collected will remain in secure storage for up to five 
years after the research has been completed and be written up as part 
of a DClinPsy student’s coursework; 
 Yes / No 
7. I understand that relevant sections of the data collected during the 
study may be looked at by members of the research team.  
 Yes/No 
8. The results of the study may be published but both the school’s 
anonymity and the children’s anonymity will be preserved. Anonymised 
data may also be shared with other researchers in the future.    
 Yes / No 
I agree for this school to take part in the study.   
Name of school: ______________________________________________________ 
_____________________             _______________     _______________ 
Printed name of Headteacher Signature   Date 
_____________________             ________________ _______________ 
Printed name of Researcher  Signature   Date  
2 copies: 1 for Headteacher, 1 for Researcher 
Headteacher Consent Form 
(Version 2: June 2018) 
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Children’s Metacognition:  
Are older children more aware of making mistakes when carrying out a task 
compared to younger children? Do they also have more awareness about how 
they learn best?  
Name of researcher: Becky Jenkin 
I have read the information leaflet (version 2: June 2018) for the above study. I have 
had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions, and have had these 
answered satisfactorily. I understand that I am free to request any further information at 
any stage.  
I know that: (please circle Yes / No) 
    
1. My class’s participation is entirely voluntary;  Yes / No 
2. I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without 
mine or the school’s legal rights being affected; 
 Yes / No 
3. I understand that the research will be taking place in a room designated 
to the researcher by the school, and will involve each child being taken 
out of class for approximately 45 minutes each; 
 Yes / No 
 
4. 
 
I understand that any teacher, parent/carer or child can decide not to 
take part or withdraw from the study and that this will result in no 
negative consequences.   
 Yes / No 
5. the data that is collected will remain in secure storage for up to five years 
after the research has been completed and be written up as part of a 
DClinPsy student’s coursework; 
 Yes / No 
6. I understand that relevant sections of the data collected during the study 
may be looked at by members of the research team.  
 Yes/No 
7. The results of the study may be published but both the school’s 
anonymity and the children’s anonymity will be preserved. Anonymised 
data may also be shared with other researchers in the future.    
 Yes / No 
I agree for my class to take part in the study.   
 
Name of school: ______________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________ ________________  ____________________ 
Printed name of Teacher  Signature    Date 
__________________________ ________________  ____________________ 
Printed name of Researcher  Signature    Date 
Teacher Consent Form 
(Version 2: June 2018) 
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2 copies: 1 for teacher, 1 for Researcher 
Appendix F 
Information Leaflet and Consent Form for Parents/Carers 
 
Children’s Metacognition:  
Are older children more aware of making mistakes when carrying out a task 
compared to younger children? Do they also have more awareness about how 
they learn best?   
Introduction 
My name is Becky Jenkin and I am a student based at the University of Exeter. I am 
currently completing my training to become a Clinical Psychologist. As part of this I am 
carrying out a research project, about children’s metacognition, how they think about 
their thinking. It is looking at whether children become more aware at noticing when 
they make mistakes on a task as they get older. The project has been reviewed by the 
University of Exeter Psychology Ethics Committee. 
 
Why have I been approached? 
We have been approaching schools in XXXX to see if they would be interested in 
taking part in the study. Your child’s school has agreed to help with my research. This 
information leaflet has been sent to ALL children in your child’s class. The school 
has not given us any information about any child, and they are sending you this leaflet 
on our behalf.   
   
What will happen during the study? 
Your child will be asked to some activities with Becky, which will take about 45 minutes. 
This will happen during school time. This is happening with children between the ages 
of 7 and 14 years old. The scores will be compared to see how children’s’ thinking 
changes as they get older. 
  
All children will be asked to complete activities looking at their abilities to predict and 
evaluate what they are carrying out. There will also be an activity that looks at their 
ability to detect errors. The answers they give during these activities will be recorded by 
Becky. Overall this data should teach us more about how children think about their own 
thinking style.   
 
The tasks the children complete are set up as puzzles and games, which are suitable 
for their age. They are not being tested on their overall intelligence – we are only 
comparing the results of the measures by age. 
 
Your child can decide not to take part, or choose to stop the study at any point. 
This will be told to them at the start of the study.   
 
Permission that is required 
The headteacher at your child’s school, and also your child’s teacher, have given 
permission for the study to go ahead. I am contacting all parents in your child’s class to 
see if they would be willing to let their child take part. Whether your child does or not is 
entirely up to you. 
  
If you are happy for your child to take part then please sign the form that 
comes with this leaflet, and hand it back into the reception desk at your 
school. This has to be done by DATE. 
Information Leaflet for Parents/Carers 
(Version 2: June 2018) 
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If you do not want your child to take part you do not need to do anything. 
Children will not take part in the research without parent/carer 
permission. 
 
 
Can the school, individual children or teachers change our minds and withdraw 
from the study? 
Yes. The school, children and teachers are free to withdraw from the study at any 
point, without giving a reason, and without legal rights being affected. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
This research fits within the science curriculum (working scientifically), teaching 
children about scientific attitudes and experimental skills and investigations. 
 
What if I do not want my child to take part? 
You do not need to do anything, as parent/carer consent is required for every child who 
takes part in the study.  
 
Confidentiality and security of Information 
All information that we collect about each child will be kept confidential and 
anonymous, unless doing so would put anyone at risk of serious harm. In accordance 
with the research ethical guidance of the University of Exeter Psychology Ethics 
Committee the information collected in the study will be used for research purposes 
only and stored securely, in a locked filing cabinet or on a password protected laptop. 
All data will be treated anonymously and destroyed 5 years after publication.  
 
The data collected during the study may be looked at by members of the research 
team. We will aim to publish the findings from this study so other people working in this 
area can learn about our work. All schools and children taking part will be completely 
anonymous in the study, and will not be identified in any publication. Anonymised data 
may also be shared with other researchers in the future.  
 
The University of Exeter processes personal data for the purposes of carrying out 
research in the public interest. The University will endeavour to be transparent about its 
processing of your personal data and this information sheet should provide a clear 
explanation of this. If you do have any queries about the University’s processing of your 
personal data that cannot be resolved by the research team, further information may be 
obtained from the University’s Data Protection Officer by emailing 
dataprotection@exeter.ac.uk or at www.exeter.ac.uk/dataprotection 
 
Any questions? 
If you have any questions about this study, either now or in the future, please contact: 
  
Becky Jenkin 
DClinPsy student         rebecca.jenkin@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Jenny Limond 
Senior lecturer at the University of Exeter     
(Supervisor on this project)     J.Limond@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about the way in which this study has been carried out 
please contact the Chair of the University of Exeter Psychology Ethics Committee:- 
 
Lisa Leaver 
Chair, UoE Psychology Ethics Committee  l.a.leaver@ex.ac.uk 
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Thank you very much for considering this request. 
 
 
 
 
 
Children’s Metacognition:  
Are older children more aware of making mistakes when 
carrying out a task compared to younger children? Do they 
also have more awareness about how they learn best?   
 
Name of researcher: Becky Jenkin  
 
Please only fill this out if you are happy for your child to take part in the study, 
and so give your consent. If you do not give consent for them to take part 
you do not need to do anything; children will not take part in the study without 
parent/carer consent.  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information leaflet (version 2: June 
2018) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, 
ask questions by emailing the researchers, and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my child’s participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw 
my child from the study at any time without giving any reason and without my legal 
rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that the research will be taking place in a room designated to the 
researcher by the school, and will involve each child being taken out of class for 
approximately 45 minutes; 
 
4. I understand that answers my child gives during the study will be recorded, and 
relevant sections of this data may be looked at by members of the research team.  
 
5. I understand that the data collected will remain in secure storage for up to five 
years after the research has been completed and be written up as part of a 
DClinPsy student’s coursework; 
 
6. I understand that the results of the study may be published but both the school’s 
anonymity and the children’s anonymity will be preserved. Anonymised data may 
also be shared with other researchers in the future.   
 
7. I understand that the researcher has gained consent from the headteacher and 
class teacher to carry out this study. 
 
I GIVE CONSENT for my child to take part in the above study. 
 
 
Name of Child:
 ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
______________________________ ________________ 
 ____________________ 
Your Name     Date    Signature 
Consent Form 
(Version 2: June 2018) 
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Please return this form to (TEACHER) by DATE 
Thank you very much 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN  96 
Appendix G 
Child Information Sheet, Consent Form and Debrief Sheet 
 
Becky’s research study: Child Information sheet  
 
 
My name is Becky and I am working with your school. I want to 
know more about children’s thinking. 
 
In particular I am interested in what children think about an 
activity before, during, and after they complete the activity. 
 
For the next 45 minutes you will be doing a few activities with 
me. I will be recording the answers you give me. 
 
Once I have completed the study with all children I will look at 
all of the answers together, to learn more about children’s 
thinking. 
 
 
You do not have to take part. 
 
 
You can stop at any point, and ask me to not use the answers 
you have given.  No one but me will know the answers you give 
me. 
 
 
The only time I would pass information on about you would be if 
you tell me something I think may be harming you or someone 
else. If this were to happen I would tell a teacher. 
 
 
Please feel free to ask if you have any questions now. 
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Becky’s research: Child assent form 
 
 
I have read the information sheet about the study, and I 
understand it.  
 
All my questions have been answered. 
 
I know why I am doing these activities. 
 
I know that I can decide not to take part at any point, and ask 
for my answers not to be used. 
 
I know that the answers I give cannot be linked to me. 
  
 
I understand all this and so agree to take part. 
 
 
 
 
 
……………………………………. 
(Your name) 
 
 
 
.................................................  ………………  
(Name of child)        (Number) 
 
 
.................................................    
(Name of researcher)       
 
................ 
(Date) 
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Becky’s research study: Debrief sheet  
 
Participant number: 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in my research study. The study was 
interested in children’s thinking when completing different 
activities.  
 
 
It has involved doing a few activities with me. I recorded the 
answers you gave me. 
 
 
If you have decided you do not want me to use the answers you 
gave me as part of the research then please tell me. Or you can 
tell your teacher. 
 
 
If you decide that you do not want me to use the answers you 
gave me in the future, please tell your teacher and give them 
your participant number (at the top of the page) by: 
 
 
Please feel free to ask any questions you have. 
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Appendix H 
Missing Data for JOC Questions 
Table A1. 
The number (N) of missing data points for each of the Judgment Of Confidence 
(JOC) questions.  
JOC Question Missing data (N) 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
5 3 
6 0 
7 23 
8 17 
9 2 
10 4 
11 1 
12 0 
13 0 
14 77 
15 28 
16 27 
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Appendix I 
Outlier Analysis 
Table A2. 
Correlations among prediction, error detection, evaluation, and metacognitive 
knowledge by age with outliers removed. 
 
Younger participants 
 Prediction Error detection Evaluation 
Emergent Awareness    
     Prediction    
     Error Detection .08   
     Evaluation -.14 -.27*  
Subjective metacognitive 
knowledge 
-.18 -.17 -.11 
Older participants 
 Prediction Error detection Evaluation 
Emergent Awareness    
     Prediction    
     Error Detection .26*   
     Evaluation .26* .10  
Subjective metacognitive 
knowledge 
.04 -.05 -.26* 
Difference between correlations coefficients for older vs. younger (z) 
 Prediction Error detection Evaluation 
Emergent Awareness    
     Prediction    
     Error Detection -.94   
     Evaluation -2.08* -2.07*  
Subjective metacognitive 
knowledge 
-.1.17 -.64 .85 
*p < .05.    
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Appendix J 
Dissemination Statement 
I presented an outline of the research and preliminary findings to 
teachers at a Secondary School (where I collected the data) in November 2018, 
as part of a teacher’s evening on metacognition.  
This thesis will be submitted as part of the requirements of the doctoral 
programme. I will also be completing a presentation on the research in June 
2019 at the University of Exeter, to Trainee Clinical Psychologists and staff. 
Schools who took part in the study will receive an information leaflet 
outlining the research findings. I will also offer to go in to these schools to give 
presentations on the research to teachers and other interested parties. 
I intend on submitting a research paper for publication in Consciousness 
and Cognition, a peer-reviewed journal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix K 
METACOGNITION IN CHILDREN 
112 
Preparation and Submission Requirements for Consciousness and Cognition 
Consciousness and Cognition, An International Journal, provides a forum for a 
natural science approach to the issues of consciousness, voluntary control, and 
self. The journal features empirical research (in the form of articles) and 
theoretical reviews. The journal aims to be both scientifically rigorous and open 
to novel contributions. 
Guide for Authors 
The file should be saved in the native format of the wordprocessor used. The 
text should be in single-spaced in single-column format. Keep the layout of the 
text as simple as possible. Most formatting codes will be removed and replaced 
on processing the article. In particular, do not use the wordprocessor's options 
to justify text or to hyphenate words. However, do use bold face, italics, 
subscripts, superscripts etc. When preparing tables, if you are using a table 
grid, use only one grid for each individual table and not a grid for each row. If no 
grid is used, use tabs, not spaces, to align columns. The electronic text should 
be prepared in a way very similar to that of conventional manuscripts (see also 
the Guide to Publishing with Elsevier: 
https://www.elsevier.com/guidepublication). Note that source files of figures, 
tables and text graphics will be required whether or not you embed your figures 
in the text. See also the section on Electronic artwork.  
Article structure 
Divide your article into clearly defined and numbered sections. Subsections 
should be numbered 1.1 (then 1.1.1, 1.1.2, ...), 1.2, etc. (the abstract is not 
included in section numbering). Use this numbering also for internal cross-
referencing: do not just refer to 'the text'. Any subsection may be given a brief 
heading. Each heading should appear on its own separate line. 
Introduction  
State the objectives of the work and provide an adequate background, avoiding 
a detailed literature survey or a summary of the results. 
Material and methods  
Provide sufficient details to allow the work to be reproduced by an independent 
researcher. Methods that are already published should be summarized, and 
indicated by a reference. If quoting directly from a previously published method, 
use quotation marks and also cite the source. Any modifications to existing 
methods should also be described. 
 
Results  
Results should be clear and concise. 
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Discussion  
This should explore the significance of the results of the work, not repeat them. 
A combined Results and Discussion section is often appropriate. Avoid 
extensive citations and discussion of published literature. 
Conclusions  
The main conclusions of the study may be presented in a short Conclusions 
section, which may stand alone or form a subsection of a Discussion or Results 
and Discussion section. 
Appendices  
If there is more than one appendix, they should be identified as A, B, etc. 
Formulae and equations in appendices should be given separate numbering: 
Eq. (A.1), Eq. (A.2), etc.; in a subsequent appendix, Eq. (B.1) and so on. 
Similarly, for tables and figures: Table A.1; Fig. A.1, etc. 
Essential title page information  
• Title. Concise and informative. Titles are often used in information-retrieval 
systems. Avoid abbreviations and formulae where possible. 
• Author names and affiliations. Please clearly indicate the given name(s) and 
family name(s) of each author and check that all names are accurately spelled. 
You can add your name between parentheses in your own script behind the 
English transliteration. Present the authors' affiliation addresses (where the 
actual work was done) below the names. Indicate all affiliations with a lower-
case superscript letter immediately after the author's name and in front of the 
appropriate address. Provide the full postal address of each affiliation, including 
the country name and, if available, the e-mail address of each author. 
• Corresponding author. Clearly indicate who will handle correspondence at all 
stages of refereeing and publication, also post-publication 
Abstract  
A concise and factual abstract is required. The abstract should state briefly the 
purpose of the research, the principal results and major conclusions. An 
abstract is often presented separately from the article, so it must be able to 
stand alone. For this reason, References should be avoided, but if essential, 
then cite the author(s) and year(s). Also, non-standard or uncommon 
abbreviations should be avoided, but if essential they must be defined at their 
first mention in the abstract itself. 
